# 1NC

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#### Next off – *Topicality*

#### “USFG should” means public policy through governmental means

Ericson ‘3

Jon M. Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting – “The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to prioritize stasis points that foster the depth of rejoinder crucial for optimizing argument skills.

#### Prioritize Learning to argue (L.T.A.) over Arguing To Learn content (A.T.L.)---it’s a process that treats developing argument skills as the end-point ---Any other model deploys argumentation as a means to include and infuse specific-content---Debate’s unique because it provides a space for fostering Argument skills.

Schwarz ‘9

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Implications of Research on Learning to Argue on Education

The research we ~~overviewed~~ (examined) has very important educational implications, on the role of school to foster argumentative skills. School should be sensitive to providing adequate contexts for argumentation. In general, the effort of the educator should be put on (1) designing situations in which the personal goals of the students (implied by the design) will help them engage in situations with educational value, (2) help students in identifying the goals of all participants. Another insight is that the explicit teaching of argumentative skills is often valueless: since students acquire basic argumentative skills very early, what is more needed is to contextualize these skills in educational settings. Schwarz and Glassner (2003) have described the asymmetry between everyday life and scientific argumentation through personifying everyday argumentation by a ~~blind~~ (visually impaired) person) and scientific argumentation by a paralytic person: The ~~blind~~ (visually impaired person) – the everyday arguer, can operate argumentative moves (can walk) but the result of the negotiations is often unclear – ~~he/she~~ (they) does not know exactly where to go. The paralytic – the scientific arguer, receives principles, laws, theories; he/she can see them, but is not able to move on with them, to use them in further activities. This is then the ~~job~~ (task) of the educator to design activities, and to provide tools with which the natural propensity to engage in argumentation could be capitalized for scientific issues.

This kind of result puts to the fore the importance of education and suggests that when Kuhn showed that “argumentative skills” are more elaborated among persons that learned at university, this does not necessarily mean that these “skills” characterize people who (will) go to the university but simply that students can learn to use argumentative skills naturally deployed in everyday discussions, in formal settings (such as interviews) and when they are invited to discuss scientific issues.

Educational programs generally do not put to the foreground of their rationales the fostering of argumentation. Rather, many educational programs are dedicated to promote “critical thinking” but their implementation heavily depends on the instilment of argumentative practices. Still, the variety of these programs is immense. Since, as we pointed out, argumentative practices are highly sensible to the goals of the participants (and of course, among them the teacher), it is important to identify the ideologies that underlie educational programs fostering critical thinking and argumentation. For example, in Perkins’ Point Zero program, the learning to argue is realized through explicit coaching that express an ideology that considers education to think as the acquisition of thinking skills similarly to an apprentice that acquires craft in a workshop. And indeed, students are coached to express argumentative skills which are generally considered as meta-cognitive skills in a cognitive apprenticeship setting. One of the most celebrated programs dedicated to critical thinking is Lipman’s “Philosophy for children” (P4C) (Lipman 1991) in which students are presented issues with a (folk) philosophical character and that are relevant to society. According to his ideology, critical thinking concerns understanding and not skills. The understanding is realized through dialogues among students, and dialogues between students and the teacher. Mercer’s “Thinking Together” program (Dawes et al. 2000) concerns another ideology, the fact that education to thinking should focus on fostering dispositions rather than skills or understanding. Concerning argumentation, students are invited to comply with ground rules about what they call “exploratory talk” (and which could be called also critical reasoning). These rules are well known by students but they must enact them during classroom discussions. The role of the teacher is to sustain collective talk according to such ground rules. These three programs for fostering critical reasoning are quite archetypical. They differ strongly according to their ideologies and such ideologies induce different kinds of argumentation. Although we favor plurality (we are more sympathetic to an understanding-dialogic ideology, though) it is imperious to evaluate the programs that foster “learning to argue” with tools that fit their underlying methodology. For example, while P4C is clearly a program whose ideology concerns understanding, its impact has been measured by using tools pertaining to the acquisition of skills ideology. This is probably for this reason that, although the P4C program seems a sophisticated and extremely well-designed program, its evaluation shows mixed results: the tools for evaluating the P4C program are generally tools that fit a “skill acquisition methodology.”

4 Arguing to Learn

In comparison with “Learning to argue” the volume of research and of educational initiatives that focus on argumentation as a tool for learning specific content is much more voluminous. In the two last decades, theoretical, empirical, and design efforts have been invested in this direction. We review first the theoretical work that has been done. This review is important since it impinges on empirical studies as well as the setting of learning activities. We then review empirical studies that have general implications on the relationships between argumentative activity and learning. Such studies have given birth to tools and strategies that may afford productive argumentation. In the last subsection we review research on argumentation and learning in specific domains, mathematics, science, history, and civic education.

4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings: Why Argumentative Activities Can Lead to Learning

The various definitions of argumentation point at social as well as cognitive aspects (e.g., as defined by van Eemeren and colleagues – see chapter “Argumentation as an Object of Interest and as a Social and Cultural Resource”). We will see that from a theoretical point of view, each of these aspects should lead to learning.

According to the cognitive aspect, argument generation, whether in solitary or group format, causes a person to ponder the explanations behind solutions or perspectives, and requires him/her to express them in verbal, explicit communication. Such an act taken in isolation is also a self-explanation whose generation would be expected to lead to the “self-explanation effect” (Chi 2000 , Chi et al. 1989 , Chi et al. 1994 , Neuman and Schwarz 1998, 2000) : the act of epistemic examination of one’s personal theories and the reasons behind them is considered to improve understanding and knowledge construction processes (Baker 1999 , Chi et al. 1989 , Kuhn 1991) . However, argument generation in an argumentative activity conveys more than an explicit verbal articulation of theories and their reasons per se. The verbal articulation is directed to another person, and may further encourage clarification of contradictions and faults in one’s understanding, especially when communications are aimed at convincing others. In fact, research on accountability effects has shown that even the mere anticipation of an unknown audience that might require explanations or justifications has been found to improve a person’s quality of thinking (see for example Tetlock 1992) . Thus, this type of nondialectical or one-sided argumentation alone is expected to yield cognitive gains.

In addition, dialectical argumentation requires, by definition, the examination and coordination of different perspectives. Participants are forced to acquire new information about the topic under consideration, since they are exposed to a multiplicity of ideas and encouraged to explore the validity of each of these ideas. This means that they have to consider objections to their personal theories and assumptions, to attempt to understand alternative positions and to formulate objections and/or counter-objections (Stein and Miller 1991) . Thus, the mere effect of exposure to and creation of more relevant information in argumentative contexts would alone be expected to lead to better learning results. In addition to such cumulative effects, *however*, the dialectical dimension of argumentative interaction is thought to have considerable qualitative advantages. First of all, when engaged in exploring the reasons why a certain theory is faulty, it not only allows one to propose convincing arguments to refute that position in a discussion, but it also deepens his/her understanding of the correct concept in the process (see also Kuhn 1992) . Secondly, argumentation’s unique structure of linking premises, conclusions, conditions, rebuttals, and so forth is also thought to considerably improve and extend the organization of knowledge, which leads to better recall and understanding on subsequent test occasions (Means and Voss 1996) . This claim is further supported by current theoretical models that regard human thinking and the organization of knowledge presentations as mainly argumentative in nature (see e.g., Antaki 1994 , Billig 1996) . Accordingly, dialectical argumentation may be conceptualized as a tool, whose particular form provides a supporting and organizing structure to examine, evaluate, and elaborate on different ideas and to reach a solution.

#### That comes first - key to **Problem-Solving** – which activates **every agenda – from interpersonal to macro-political**.

Jonassen ’10 et al; Dr. David H. Jonassen - Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Missouri (Columbia) - “Arguing to learn and learning to argue: design justifications and guidelines” - Educational Technology Research and Development - vol. 58:439–457 – 2010 edition – OG published online: 21 November 2009 – E&F – Available via the Springer Link Database

Meaningful learning requires deep engagement with ideas. Deep engagement is supported by the critical thinking skill of argumentation. Learning to argue represents an important way of thinking that facilitates conceptual change and is essential for problem solving. In order to appropriately apply argumentation practices to learning, we first discuss reasons for using argumentation in learning environments or instruction. Next, we describe the skills of argumentation along with difficulties that learners experience when trying to argue. Following a brief description of the kinds of argumentation to persuade an audience of the validity of your position or solution (rhetorical) or to attempt to resolve differences in opinions or solutions (dialectical), we describe methods and guidelines for eliciting arguments from students. We conclude with processes for assessing the quality of student-generated arguments.

Why learn to argue? ‘‘It is in argument that we are likely to find the most significant way in which higher order thinking and reasoning figure in the lives of most people. Thinking as argument is implicated in all of the beliefs people hold, the judgments they make, and the conclusions they come to; it arises every time a significant decision must be made. Hence, argumentative thinking lies at the heart of what we should be concerned about in examining how, and how well, people think’’ (Kuhn 1992, pp. 156–157). Argumentation is the means by which we rationally resolve questions, issues, and disputes and solve problems. Embedding and fostering argumentative activities in learning environments promotes productive ways of thinking, conceptual change, and problem solving.

Ways of thinking

Many science education scholars argue that argumentation is central to scientific thinking (Driver et al. 2000; Duschl and Osborne 2002; Kuhn 1993; Newton et al. 1999). Practicing scientists engage in argumentation in order to articulate and refine their own scientific knowledge (vonAufschnaiter et al. 2008). When science is applied, the public uses arguments to engage in debates about important issues. For example, environmental, health, and food production issues affect the public, which must have a legitimate voice in resolving those issues (Driver et al. 2000).

Argumentation is associated with a social constructivist conception of meaning making, where students learn through reflective interactions (arguments) that engage the social coconstruction of knowledge (Driver et al. 2000; Newton et al. 1999). Contrast this conception of learning with the transmission model of authoritative facts or the discovery or inquiry model of learning through observations and induction of a body of laws and theories. Although science educators universally endorse inquiry learning, Duschl and Osborne (2002, p. 41) argued that ‘‘teaching science as a process of enquiry without the opportunity to engage in argumentation, the construction of explanations and the evaluation of evidence is to fail to represent a core component of the nature of science or to establish a site for developing student understanding.’’ Science as argument is to link the primary thinking activity of scientists to those of students (Kuhn 1993).

Argumentation engages deeper and more mature epistemological levels of learning. By arguing the basis on which claims are made, students investigate the epistemological foundations of knowledge domains (Newton et al. 1999). At the very least, argumentation engages student thinking at the multiplicity level (some knowledge is right or wrong, but most is not yet known) on Perry’s (1970) scale, and it is likely that argumentation may result in contextual relativism (student learns methods of their discipline) and possibly even commitment with relativism (choices made in the face of legitimate alternatives). Disciplinary truths must be demonstrated, not accepted on faith. Argumentation aims at the rational resolution of questions, issues, and problems (Siegal 1995). It is not only science learning that benefits from argumentation, although science educators have focused on the roles of argumentation more extensively than other disciplines. Wineburg (2001) makes an eloquent case for the importance of argumentation in interpreting history. Argumentation is an essential way of thinking about any discipline.

Conceptual change

A growing body of research has demonstrated the role of argumentation in fostering conceptual change. Conceptual change occurs when learners change their understanding of concepts they use and the conceptual frameworks that encompass them, reorganizing their frameworks to accommodate new perspectives. Argumentation leads to conceptual change (Asterhan and Schwarz 2007; Baker 1999; Nussbaum and Sinatra 2003; Wiley and Voss 1999). Embedding argumentation in science learning environments enhances conceptual and epistemic understanding and helps to make scientific reasoning visible (Duschl and Osborne 2002). Similar results have been found in the humanities. For example, instructions to write an argumentative essay on a historical topic produced better conceptual understanding than instructions to write a narrative, summary, or explanation essays (Wiley and Voss 1999). Constructing arguments engages conceptual change because of the high conceptual engagement in students (Nussbaum and Sinatra 2003).

Problem solving

Problem solving is the most ubiquitous, engaging, and essential intellectual activity in everyday and professional lives (Jonassen 2000, 2004, 2007). As Karl Popper (1999) averred, ‘‘All life is problem solving.’’ Although problems differ in structuredness, complexity, and context (Jonassen 2007), argumentation is an essential skill in learning to solve most, if not all, kinds of problems as well as a powerful method for assessing problem solving ability for both ill-structured and well-structured problems alike (Jonassen in press).

#### Only a model prioritizing predictable stasis points solves:

#### First---alignment--- Argument Skills better-tailor to inevitable Dialectical features of this activity - like vertical waves of rebuttal.

#### Affs should outline “Neg rejoinder key” warrants. Neg roles should extend BEYOND being additional members of a monological audience.

#### Models outside Topic Stasis hamper depth of preparedness and incentivize Affs like “bigotry is bad”. While powerful, such Affs don’t optimize Learning To Argue.

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Argument types

Argumentation has occupied philosophers, logicians, and rhetoricians for millennia. As with so many other issues, the roots of argumentation date to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, there are three primary purposes or functions of argumentation: apodictic (demonstrative), rhetorical, and dialectical (van Eemeren et al. 1987, 1996). Apodictic arguments seek to demonstrate absolute and reliable knowledge based on apodictic evidence that leaves no doubt about the veracity of a claim. From a naturalistic perspective, we may often state claims as apodictic truths in everyday discourse, however, those claims are rarely tested in formal educational settings and so will not be considered further.

Rhetorical arguments

Rhetorical arguments are conceived as a dialogue between an arguer and an audience and are the most common form of argumentation. The goal of rhetorical arguments, otherwise known as monological arguments, is to persuade or convince others of a claim or proposition that the arguer believes in (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Toulmin 1958) without regard to positions that others hold. A rhetorical argument is successful if it gains the approval of the target audience (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). Therefore, most rhetorical arguments concentrate on developing effective persuasive argumentation techniques.

The most prominent model of rhetorical argumentation was developed by Toulmin (1958), in which he developed a structure for argumentation, including a claim (C), data (D), a warrant (W), in addition to elements such as backing (B), qualifier (Q), and rebuttal (R) (see Fig. 1). In the process, an arguer justifies his or her claim by linking a fact (D) to the claim (C) through a warrant (W). The qualifier (Q) conveys the degree of force from data to claim, while the rebuttal contradicts the claim (R). Toulmin rejected the existence of universal norms for evaluating arguments and contended that the validity of any argument depends on the nature of the problem.

Although his model has been very influential in the field of argumentation theory, the actual application of Toulmin’s model to ordinary argumentation is somewhat problematic. Although multiple-sided arguments could use Toulmin’s framework for constructing arguments, his model fails to consider both sides of a controversial issue (Leita˜o 2001). That is, the model depicts only proponent’s side, minimizing the role of an opponent in the process of argumentation. Additionally, warrants are often implicit and therefore hard to distinguish from backing (Leita˜o 2003). Toulmin’s model may be useful for assessing an argument by an individual but is inapplicable for assessing an argumentation that involves two or more arguments. Although universally used to persuade others, rhetorical forms of argument are one-sided so they have limitations in educational settings (Driver et al. 2000), whether multiple perspective should be considered.

Dialectical arguments

Rather than a monologue between arguer and a real or imaginary audience, dialectical argumentation represents a dialogue between proponents of alternative claims during a dialogue game or a discussion. Also known as dialogical or multi-voiced arguments, the purpose of dialectical arguments is to resolve differences of opinions (Barth and Krabbe 1982; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). That resolution may take different forms. Dialectic arguments may be adversarial, where the goal is to convince opponents of the superiority of one’s claim. They may also seek a compromise between multiple claims. Dialectic arguments may take place within individuals (e.g., making a decision) or within social groups (Driver et al. 2000).

Because dialectical arguments are considered more applicable to educational purposes than rhetorical arguments, we briefly describe two prominent models of dialectical argumentation, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992) and argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning (Walton 1996), which provide useful insights into discursive argumentation.

Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren et al. 1996) views argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinions in critical discussions and suggests a formal model for conducting those discussions. Critical discussions have four essential stages: (1) confrontation stage, (2) opening stage, (3) argumentation stage, and (4) concluding stage (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren et al. 1996). During the confrontation stage, people present their different claims. If there are no differing views, then there is no argument. During the opening stage, people accept their roles and a set of rules for conducting the argument. In the argumentation stage, people defend their claims and challenge others. In the concluding stage, participants decide who wins and loses. Pragma-dialectics provides a useful model for conducting classroom or online discussions.

Another useful model of argumentation for educational purposes is Walton’s (1996) concept of presumptive arguments. Walton claims that argumentation is a goal-directed and interactive dialogue in which participants reason together to advance arguments by proving or disproving presumptions. In arguments based on presumptions, the reasoning is tentative and open to challenge (Walton 1992). In presumptive arguments, the burden of proof is shifted to the other party in a dialogue (Walton 1996). Therefore, in dialectical argumentation, counterarguments are just as important as the original argument. Walton (1996) identified 25 presumptive argumentation schemes and provided a matching set of critical questions that should be asked by respondents. These schemes provide specific models for structuring classroom and online discussions.

Deciding which kind of argument to support when deigning any learning environment depends on the purpose of that environment. If the learning goal requires promotion or persuasion, such as designing a marketing campaign, then supporting student construction of rhetorical arguments is more appropriate. When the learning goal requires the resolution of different opinions, then dialectical argumentation should be supported, with an emphasis on generating and rebutting counterarguments. In the following section, we describe methods for engaging and supporting argumentation in learning environment

#### Second---presumption---Learning To Argue’s a pre-req to the internalizing content.

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Surprisingly, despite its recognized importance in higher education, argumentation in research writing in L2 contexts has received far less attention than it richly deserves. This situation impels drawing from the L1 argumentation scholarship to gain deeper insights into the concept of argumentation (Hirvela, 2017). It is useful to consider Hirvela’s observation of the distinction between learning to argue and arguing to learn in the L1 argumentation literature to understand the notion of argumentation in L2 contexts as well.

Learning to argue ~~views~~ (considers) argumentation as reasoning where students learn to present a position/claim after analyzing and evaluating ideas from source texts, and to logically support the position/claim thus made with relevant evidence drawn from the same source texts, and to coherently establish a link between the evidence used and the claims made. Hence, the purpose of argumentation in this view is to convince and persuade the audience with ‘the logic underlying the ways in which its claims are supported and explained’ (Hirvela, 2017, p. 71).

Arguing to learn, on the other hand, ~~views~~ (considers) argumentation as inquiry where students learn to use the elements of argumentation as a means to develop deeper ‘understanding of a topic and thinking skills’ (Hirvela, 2017, p. 71).The purpose of argumentation in this ~~views~~ (perspective) is ‘not to teach how to construct arguments’ (Hirvela, 2017, p. 71), but to enable them to use the elements of argument as tools for their critical engagement with text. It becomes obvious that the learning to argue perspective is a prerequisite for arguing to learn perspective to be in operation. In the present study, both views of argumentation were exposed to the students.

Since the idea of argumentation is abstract and not visible to the naked eye, it sounds rather ‘unrealistic to expect all or even the majority of students’ (Nesi and Gardner, 2012, p. 261) to acquire the ability to process and produce arguments in writing through the process of osmosis rather than explicit instruction. ‘Unfocussed exposure to unorganized’ (Thornbury, 1999, p. 50) content in the source texts may at best leave readers with tacit knowledge of argumentation, which, when not articulated properly at the time of providing feedback on student writing, makes students confused and frustrated. Recognizing this gap, the present study made a modest attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of an EAP course on argument building for research students and its impact on their performance in developing arguments. This study was also a modest response to Hirvela’s call for classroom-based research on L2 argumentative writing in HEIs. This study had the following objectives:

• To evaluate the effectiveness of an EAP course on argument building for research scholars and

• To assess the impact of the course on the students' performance in building arguments.

The study assumes significance as it establishes the value of explicit instruction of argumentation in higher education going beyond surface features of language and style.

Literature review

Over the past four decades, much of published EAP writing research has focused on different sections of research articles (see for example Kanoksilapatham, 2007; Swales, 1990, 2004) corrective feedback (Ferris, 2002; Hyland & Hyland, 2006), metadiscourse (Hyland, 2005), source use (Pecorari and Shaw, 2013; Polio and Shi, 2012) and plagiarism (Pecorari, 2013), to name just a few. Though the findings of these studies have made substantial contribution to both academic writing research and pedagogy, ESL students in universities do not seem to have any support system that enables them to approach academic writing without trepidation. This is possibly due to scant attention paid to argumentation, the important role of which, as Hirvela (2017) indicates, has been recognized, but ‘marginalized as a major topic of investigation’ (p.70). Argument building in academic writing requires students to critically engage with the ideas from source texts for making claims and bringing relevant evidence to support them, and to establish a link between the evidence so used and the claims made. Such an engagement is made possible by consciousness-raising tasks that draw students’ attention to both the macrostructure of argumentation and the lexico-grammatical choices deployed for making meanings in the text. To develop such an awareness and thereby scaffold learners to gain confidence in dealing with argumentation both in reading and writing, it becomes important to design an EAP course on argumentation in academic writing instruction.

There is no consensus on the way the term ‘argumentation’ is understood in L2 literature. While some (Bacha, 2010; Crammond, 1998; Davies, 2008; Mitchell and Andrews, 2000; Wingate, 2012) ~~view~~ (consider) it as the ability to persuade the reader to adopt the writer’s position with the choreography of well-supported claims ‘effectively grounded in source-based evidence’ (Pessoa, et.al., 2018, p. 82), others (Jonassen and Kim, 2010; Kuhn, 1991, 2005; Ravenscroft, et.al., 2006) perceive it as a means to develop ‘deeper understanding of a topic or a situation through an analytic process’ (Hirvela 2017, p. 71). As discussed in the previous section, the former ~~view~~ (perspective) relates to learning to argue while the latter ~~view~~ (perspective) relates to arguing to learn. An important point to be noted from the two views is that both views consider the purpose of the argument as their point of departure rather than the structure of the argument. For both ~~views~~ (perspectives), however, it is the structure that is at the core of the argument which in turn can serve any of the purposes mentioned in either ~~view~~ (perspective) or both. The structure essentially includes claim (initially stated conclusion), data (facts supporting the claim), warrant (connections established between the data and the claim), backing (support/explanation for the warrant), qualifier (tempering strength of the claim), and rebuttal (response to counterclaims) as elements of good argumentation (Andrews, 2010). Therefore, it is logical to teach learning to argue and then – building on the knowledge and skills acquired through this approach – to show how argumentation can be deployed as a means to deepening learning and thinking.

#### Such content may be important, but ARGUING TO LEARN IT is forever complicated by dynamics of a competitive ballot.

Baker ‘9

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Argumentation, in the context considered here, functions as a means of transforming the degree of acceptability of problem solutions, from the ~~points of view~~ (perspectives) of students, it influences which solutions will be retained or rejected, and thus types of learning that are understood in terms of measures of the quality of solutions. Two simple cases would be where the better-argued (defended) solution is mutually accepted, and where a putative solution is refuted and thus not mutually accepted.

But such cases of argumentative “defense-acceptance” and “refutation-rejection” are problematic, in both theoretical and empirical terms. The first problem concerns the distinction between acceptance and belief (Baker 2000a) : for reasons relating to the dynamics of debate, a student may be obliged to accept or reject a solution, but may not genuinely believe in it in the first case, and may continue to believe in it in the second. The existence of such differences can be determined by analysing the dialogue following the argumentation sequence in question; but it nothing further is said relating to that sequence, the question must remain unanswered. A further empirical problem relates to the fact that there is nothing to guarantee that the best solutions are in fact retained and not rejected. In one case of problem-solving in physics, however, it has been shown that more elaborate physical models “win out” as a result of argumentation.

#### Our impact turns theirs but the inverse is impossible---micro and macropolitical trends are only resolvable under our model because they are a product of problem-solving error replication.

Lindsley ‘22

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In today’s increasingly complex world, we are constantly ~~faced~~ (confronted) with ill-defined problems that don’t have a clear solution. From poverty and climate change to crime and addiction, complex situations surround us. Unlike simple problems with a pre-defined or “right” answer, complex problems share several basic characteristics that make them hard to solve. While these problems can be frustrating and overwhelming, they also offer an opportunity for growth and creativity. Complex problem-solving skills are the key to addressing these tough issues. In this article, I will discuss simple versus complex problems, define complex problem solving, and describe why it is so important in complex dynamic environments. I will also explain how to develop problem-solving skills and share some tips for effectively solving complex problems. How is simple problem-solving different from complex problem-solving? Solving problems is about getting from a currently undesirable state to an intended goal state. In other words, about bridging the gap between “what is” and “what ought to be”. However, the challenge of reaching a solution varies based on the kind of problem that is being solved. There are generally three different kinds of problems you should consider. Puzzles Simple problems have one problem solution. The goal is to find that answer as quickly and efficiently as possible. Puzzles are classic examples of simple problem solving. The objective is to find the one correct solution out of many possibilities. Problems Problems are different from puzzles in that they don’t have a known problem solution. As such, many people may agree that there is an issue to be solved, but they may not agree on the intended goal state or how to get there. In this type of problem, people spend a lot of time debating the best solution and the optimal way to achieve it. Messes Messes are collections of interrelated problems where many stakeholders may not even agree on what the issue is. Unlike problems where there is agreement about what the problem is, in messes, there isn’t agreement amongst stakeholders. In other words, even “what is” can’t be taken for granted. Most complex social problems are messes, made up of interrelated social issues with ill-defined boundaries and goals. Problems and messes can be complicated or complex Puzzles are simple, but problems and messes exist on a continuum between complicated and complex. Complicated problems are technical in nature. There may be many involved variables, but the relationships are linear. As a result, complicated problems have step-by-step, systematic solutions. Repairing an engine or building a rocket may be difficult because of the many parts involved, but it is a technical problem we call complicated. On the other hand, solving a complex problem is entirely different. Unlike complicated problems that may have many variables with linear relationships, a complex problem is characterized by connectivity patterns that are harder to understand and predict. Characteristics of complex problems and messes So what else makes a problem complex? Here are seven additional characteristics (from Funke and Hester and Adams). Lack of information. There is often a lack of data or information about the problem itself. In some cases, variables are unknown or cannot be measured. Many goals. A complex problem has a mix of conflicting objectives. In some sense, every stakeholder involved with the problem may have their own goals. However, with limited resources, not all goals can be simultaneously satisfied. Unpredictable feedback loops. In part due to many variables connected by a range of different relationships, a change in one variable is likely to have effects on other variables in the system. However, because we do not know all of the variables it will affect, small changes can have disproportionate system-wide effects. These unexpected events that have big, unpredictable effects are sometimes called Black Swans. Dynamic. A complex problem changes over time and there is a significant impact based on when you act. In other words, because the problem and its parts and relationships are constantly changing, an action taken today won’t have the same effects as the same action taken tomorrow. Time-delayed. It takes a while for cause and effect to be realized. Thus it is very hard to know if any given intervention is working. Unknown unknowns. Building off the previous point about a lack of information, in a complex problem you may not even know what you don’t know. In other words, there may be very important variables that you are not even aware of. Affected by (error-prone) humans. Simply put, human behavior tends to be illogical and unpredictable. When humans are involved in a problem, avoiding error may be impossible. What is complex problem-solving? “Complex problem solving” is the term for how to address a complex problem or messes that have the characteristics listed above. Since a complex problem is a different phenomenon than a simple or complicated problem, solving them requires a different approach. Methods designed for simple problems, like systematic organization, deductive logic, and linear thinking don’t work well on their own for a complex problem. And yet, despite its importance, there isn’t complete agreement about what exactly it is. How is complex problem solving defined by experts? Let’s look at what scientists, researchers, and system thinkers have come up with in terms of a definition for solving a complex problem. As a series of observations and informed decisions For many employers, the focus is on making smart decisions. These must weigh the future effects to the company of any given solution. According to Indeed.com, it is defined as “a series of observations and informed decisions used to find and implement a solution to a problem. Beyond finding and implementing a solution, complex problem solving also involves considering future changes to circumstance, resources, and capabilities that may affect the trajectory of the process and success of the solution. Complex problem solving also involves considering the impact of the solution on the surrounding environment and individuals.” As using information to review options and develop solutions For others, it is more of a systematic way to consider a range of options. According to O\*NET, the definition focuses on “identifying complex problems and reviewing related information to develop and evaluate options and implement solutions.” As a self-regulated psychological process Others emphasize the broad range of skills and emotions needed for change. In addition, they endorse an inspired kind of pragmatism. For example, Dietrich Dorner and Joachim Funke define it as “a collection of self-regulated psychological processes and activities necessary in dynamic environments to achieve ill-defined goals that cannot be reached by routine actions. Creative combinations of knowledge and a broad set of strategies are needed. Solutions are often more bricolage than perfect or optimal. The problem-solving process combines cognitive, emotional, and motivational aspects, particularly in high-stakes situations. Complex problems usually involve knowledge-rich requirements and collaboration among different persons.” As a novel way of thinking and reasoning Finally, some emphasize the multidisciplinary nature of knowledge and processes needed to tackle a complex problem. Patrick Hester and Kevin MacG. Adams have stated that “no single discipline can solve truly complex problems. Problems of real interest, those vexing ones that keep you up at night, require a discipline-agnostic approach…Simply they require us to think systemically about our problem…a novel way of thinking and reasoning about complex problems that encourages increased understanding and deliberate intervention.” A synthesis definition By pulling the main themes of these definitions together, we can get a sense of what complex problem-solvers must do: Gain a better understanding of the phenomena of a complex problem or mess. Use a discipline-agnostic approach in order to develop deliberate interventions. Take into consideration future impacts on the surrounding environment. Why is complex problem solving important? Many efforts aimed at complex social problems like reducing homelessness and improving public health – despite good intentions giving more effort than ever before – are destined to fail because their approach is based on simple problem-solving. And some efforts might even unwittingly be contributing to the problems they’re trying to solve. Einstein said that “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” I think he could have easily been alluding to the need for more complex problem solvers who think differently. So what skills are required to do this? What are complex problem-solving skills? The skills required to solve a complex problem aren’t from one domain, nor are they an easily-packaged bundle. Rather, I like to think of them as a balancing act between a series of seemingly opposite approaches but synthesized. This brings a sort of cognitive dissonance into the process, which is itself informative. It brings F. Scott Fitzgerald’s maxim to mind: “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to ~~hold (~~consider) two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to ~~see~~ (consider) that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise.” To ~~see~~ (consider) the problem situation clearly, for example, but also with a sense of optimism and possibility. Here are the top three dialectics to keep in mind: Thinking and reasoning Reasoning is the ability to make logical deductions based on evidence and counterevidence. On the other hand, thinking is more about imagining an unknown reality based on thoughts about the whole picture and how the parts could fit together. By thinking clearly, one can have a sense of possibility that prepares the mind to deduce the right action in the unique moment at hand. As Dorner and Funke explain: “Not every situation requires the same action, and we may want to act this way or another to reach this or that goal. This appears logical, but it is a logic based on constantly shifting grounds: We cannot know whether necessary conditions are met, sometimes the assumptions we have made later turn out to be incorrect, and sometimes we have to revise our assumptions or make completely new ones. It is necessary to constantly switch between our sense of possibility and our sense of reality, that is, to switch between thinking and reasoning. It is an arduous process, and some people ~~handle~~ (address) it well, while others do not.” Analysis and reductionism combined with synthesis and holism It’s important to be able to use scientific processes to break down a complex problem into its parts and analyze them. But at the same time, a complex problem is more than the sum of its parts. In most cases, the relationships between the parts are more important than the parts themselves. Therefore, decomposing problems with rigor isn’t enough. What’s needed, once problems are reduced and understood, is a way of understanding the relationships between various components as well as putting the pieces back together. However, synthesis and holism on their own without deductive analysis can often miss details and relationships that matter. What makes this balancing act more difficult is that certain professions tend to be trained in and prefer one domain over the other. Scientists prefer analysis and reductionism whereas most social scientists and practitioners default to synthesis and holism. Unfortunately, this divide of preferences results in people working in their silos at the expense of multi-disciplinary approaches that together can better “see” complexity. Situational awareness and self-awareness Dual awareness is the ability to pay attention to two experiences simultaneously. In the case of complex problems, context really matters. In other words, problem-solving exists in an ecosystem of environmental factors that are not incidental. Personal and cultural preferences play a part as do current events unfolding over time. But as a problem solver, knowing the environment is only part of the equation. The other crucial part is the internal psychological process unique to every individual who also interacts with the problem and the environment. Problem solvers inevitably come into contact with others who may disagree with them, or be advancing seemingly counterproductive solutions, and these interactions result in emotions and motivations. Without self-awareness, we can become attached to our own subjective opinions, fall in love with “our” solutions, and generally be driven by the desire to be seen as problem solvers at the expense of actually solving the problem. By balancing these three dialectics, practitioners can better deal with uncertainty as well as stay motivated despite setbacks. Self-regulation among these seemingly opposite approaches also reminds one to stay open-minded.

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**Greer & Vallas ‘21**

(**Jeremie Greer**, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director at Liberation in a Generation, a national movement support organization building the power of people of color to totally transform the economy, Soros Equality Fellow, racial justice activist who began his career as a community organizer in the Columbia Heights and Shaw neighborhoods in Washington, DC, and national policy expert on the causes and the policy solutions to close racial wealth gap, formerly working at the Government Accountability Office, the Local Initiative Support Corporation, and Prosperity Now (formerly CFED), MPP George Mason University, BA Social Work, University of St. Thomas, currently working on an Executive Education Certificate in Nonprofit Leadership from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government; interviewed by **Rebecca Vallas**, senior fellow at The Century Foundation, work focuses on economic justice, formerly spent seven years at the Center for American Progress, built and lead CAP’s Poverty to Prosperity Program, and helped to establish CAP’s Disability Justice Initiative, the first disability policy project at a U.S. think tank, as well as the organization’s criminal justice reform work, her policy and advocacy work flows from her years as a legal aid lawyer, representing low-income individuals and families at Community Legal Services in Philadelphia, creator and host of Off-Kilter, a nationally distributed podcast about poverty, inequality, and everything they intersect with, JD University of Virginia, BA psychology, Emory University; “Reimagining Anti-Monopoly Activism Through Racial Justice — feat. Liberation in a Generation’s Jeremie Greer,” Off-Kilter Podcast, 3-26-2021, Modified for language that may offend - https://offkiltershow.medium.com/reimagining-anti-monopoly-activism-through-racial-justice-feat-e3a124c1c61)

**VALLAS:** And I want to quote you, because you offer, I think, a really, really smart definition here in the report. You say, “We define monopoly as a corporate entity — a single corporation, or a group of corporations — whose sheer size and anti-competitive behavior grant it disproportionate economic power and governing influence.” And as you’ve been describing, you say, “This negatively affects the well-being of workers, consumers, markets, local communities, democratic governance, and the planet.” That’s a somewhat broader definition than maybe the sort of technical antitrust definition of monopoly. But for all the reasons you’re starting to get into, you really, you argue in this report that it’s necessary that we think a little more broadly and a little more functionally about who’s operating like a monopoly, and therefore where we need to be thinking about challenging unchecked corporate power. You’ve already started to delve into the link between unchecked corporate power, monopolistic behavior, and the numerous types of racial injustice and structural racism that run rampant throughout the U.S. economy and our broader society. But you have a very powerful way that you phrase this in this report. You say, “Racial wealth inequality,” and you specifically are talking there about racial wealth inequality, “is the consequential disease caused by the oppression economy.” I can’t remember reading another publication about monopolistic behavior and the need for an anti-trust movement that draws such a **direct causal link** between **monopolies** and the ways that they operate, and **racial wealth inequality** and **structural racism**. Talk a little bit about how monopolies are contributing to the immense and historic levels of racial wealth inequality that folks are maybe more familiar with, but not aware of that link. **GREER:** Yeah. No, thanks for that question. And what I think of an important distinction around the framing there is that, yes, it is driving, monopolies are driving racial wealth inequality. And yes, monopolies are a product of an oppressive economy that is, you know, where racism is baked into the design of the economy. But they’re also a profit tier, they are gaining profit from the existence of that oppression economy. So, it is in their interest to sustain it and maintain it and to keep it going. And an example that we draw out in the paper that I think is so important and I think really illustrates this is, as we mentioned, one of the pillars that holds up the oppression economy is the criminalization of people of color. That people of color as criminals, or defined as criminals, and mass incarceration, the over-policing of Black and brown communities is something that upholds this oppression economy. And then when you have a company like Amazon who purchases the Ring Corporation — And for those that may not be familiar, Ring is a product that’s provided by Amazon in which they provide surveillance and home security to everyone. You can get a little Ring doorbell where someone rings the door. You could be at work, you can open it. It’s like, “Oh, cool. Leave my package there.” That’s how they market it. But what that does is that that Ring device pulls in a lot of data. And what we have is cameras in homes all across the country that can be used to surveil people. And what we know is one of the things that police do is they over-surveil Black and brown communities, which leads to the type of mass incarceration that we’ve seen in this country. Well, Amazon has contracts, in fact, 770 contracts with police departments so that they can get the data from those Ring devices. So, I think that really illustrates that not only are monopolies driving racial inequality through the low wages that they pay workers, through the way that they crowd out Back businesses, from the way that they treat immigrants at the workplace, but they’re also actively doing things to prop up and uphold this oppression economy because they are profiting from it. **VALLAS:** And I really want to encourage folks to read the report, especially activists and advocates who I know we have lots who listen to the show, folks in grassroots-based work who I think are really going to find this report very much geared towards them. That’s another really, I think, significantly unique aspect about what you guys have done here. This isn’t the kind of think tank report that you traditionally read, right? In a lot of ways, you actually really wrote this for, and almost to, grassroots leaders of color as sort of a primer on anti-monopoly activism, but also as something of the beginning of a tool kit that really could help people start to take this on as part and parcel of their work. I’d love to get a little bit into kind of why you structured the report this way, why you took this somewhat different approach in writing, not just for the media and for policymakers and for the Washington elites, but actually for grassroots leaders of color on the ground. I’m going to quote you again. You write, “This paper aims to contribute a major step in the long journey of bridging the divide between anti-monopoly researchers and policy advocates and grassroots leaders of color.” And you write, “The first step on that journey is knowledge.” What does the current anti-monopoly fight look like? And why do you believe, and Solana as well, why did you guys prioritize bridging this divide? **GREER:** Yeah, so, as I mentioned in my opening about Liberation in a Generation, we believe that the leaders that are going to lead us into having a **liberation economy** and dismantling this oppression economy that we’ve been talking about are grassroots leaders of color who are building power in communities. And the reason why we believe that is one, they are closest to the people who are experiencing the pain and harm of systemic racism. They are in there with them, they understand, they hear their stories, and they’re organizing them for change. The other thing that we believe is so important is that they are in the business of **building** the power, the **political power**, of those people. They’re not there to serve them, which there’s people that do that. And there’s a reason for that, and it’s important. But they see their role in helping those people build power so that they can have **the agency** to **force their government**, whether it’s a **local**, **state** or **federal**, to **act on their behalf**. And we believe that if one of the **government’s roles** is to **curb corporate monopoly power**, **they should be the ones driving that change**. Because they will **come with experiences**, which we try to reflect in the report, of **how monopoly power is impacting communities**. You know, how a Amazon distribution center in the Inland Empire in California is impacting not just the economic life, but the quality of life of people in those communities. They could speak to that in real terms. And that not only does the advocacy need to be informed by that, but also the policy making needs to be informed by that. So, what we did was, with that kind of assumption, we went to groups like the Athena Coalition, who is organizing people against Amazon across the country. We went to Color of Change, who’s an organization that is focusing on curbing the power of big tech: Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple. We went to ACRE: Action Center for Race and the Economy. And they’re doing a lot of work focusing on big banks and the corporate and monopoly power of big banks. And we said, you know, what is holding the kind of grassroots movement back from really diving in, into this anti-monopoly issue? And they came up with, there was a lot of reasons, a lot of varies they identified, and some of them that we’re working with them to solve. But one of them was, you know, we don’t have kind of a global understanding of how monopoly power impacts people of color in particular. We understand it through the lens of a particular firm, Amazon, Bank of America, like that. But we don’t really have a good grounding in how it happens globally. Therefore, our policymaking doesn’t have kind of an eye towards how could we globally and kind of more broadly address this problem in a way that impacts people across the economy? So, that’s what we hope that this paper would do: would provide that kind of grounding for grassroots leaders so that they can begin to build the type of strategies that kind of have that massive economy-wide impact for people of color. **VALLAS:** And it might be eye-opening for grassroots leaders who are learning about this issue, who are exploring whether this is something that they can get involved with. But it’s also potentially eye-opening for people who already think they know the antitrust movement or the anti-monopoly movement, given that it is incredibly rare, as you point out, for conversations about the economy to really discuss human impacts. They’re often extremely technocratic conversations, right, that have lots of facts and figures and jargon. But something that you really make a point of doing in this report, which I can’t say I’ve ever seen in a report on monopoly power or anti-trust, is you really walk through the human impacts on people of color as workers, as consumers, as residents in local communities, as small business owners and entrepreneurs, and also as subjects of surveillance, similar to the Amazon Ring concerns that you were raising before. Share some of the examples in the report of those kinds of human impacts on people of color who can obviously be more than just one of those things in that list of categories. **GREER:** Yeah, I’ll share a couple. There’s one that really, I mean, really broke my heart when I first read about it was Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother — and this is something that’s in the media. So, it’s not as if I’m violating any confidentiality here — but Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother, he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan. And this is a story we heard a lot during the ACA kind of debate and the debate around universal healthcare. But he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan, and he made this diff-, had to make this difficult choice about whether he continued to allow his mother to bear the burden of his insulin medication that he needed to regulate his diabetes, or whether he would try to do it kind of on his own. And he determined, he decided to do it on his own. And it’s a hard decision that people have to make every single day, but the cost of that insulin was so high that he was rationing it, that he wasn’t taking what the doctor prescribed. And he passed, and he died from his diabetes. And this is the type of story that we see all too often. You know, his insulin costs were $1,300 a month without insurance. And we see that a corporation that can control pricing of pharmaceuticals for a lifesaving drug like insulin is how this plays out in real life. And we can get into a law, you know, you can get into a law classroom or into a debate on Congress, and you can start to forget about the real lives that are impacted by these policies. And the reason why we wanted to talk about these stories is because that is what organizers are dealing with every day: They’re working with people that are on insulin, you know. They are working with people who are working at a Amazon fulfillment center. They’re working with people who can’t get a bank account because Bank of America has all these fees on their credit cards and their checking accounts and things like that. So, bringing these stories out is what is going, and this real **human impact**, is what **is going to mobilize**, we believe, **the type of effort that’s needed** to fight back against monopoly power. **VALLAS:** And I think we’ve got time for a few more examples, because it just, it isn’t the part of the conversation that usually gets any airtime. And it’s part of why I wanted to have you on the show is really to put a human face on some of the impacts. Share a few more examples that really, that popped for you as you were pulling this report together. **GREER:** Sure. I’d love to talk about John Ingram, who is a Black farmer in Jackson, Mississippi, and he’s a chicken farmer. He grows chickens, and he sells his chickens to Koch Foods, K-o-c-h Foods. And they are the fifth largest poultry company in the country that provides food to places all across the country. But the model which they work with John is very much in the model of the sharecropping model from post-Civil War and on into the Jim Crow era. You know, they determine the way in which John must run his farm, like to how much he feeds his chickens, to the types of facilities he keeps his chickens in, all the way to the price that they will pay to buy his chickens. And what this does is create incredible power over Black farmers like John. And what you have is — And this is pretty much allowed to take place by the USDA. He had complained, and Black farmers, many Black farmers complained to the Obama-era USDA. And because of the power of those poultry monopolies — you know, I mentioned one in the beginning, Tysons and Koch is another — they really didn’t do anything. And what we see across the country are Black farmers being forced out of business because of the power that these monopolies have. Another example that I think is really good is also in Mississippi. There’s a Nissan plant that was built in Canton, Mississippi. They relocated there. And they had gotten there because they had gotten a lot of tax breaks from the local government, from the state of Mississippi. And they did so with the promise of good jobs. They talked about jobs would be between $26 and $26 an hour. Well, the type of jobs that they provided were called perma-temp jobs. And these are basically permanent temporary jobs, which I can’t really wrap my mind around what that is, because those are conflicting. Like, what is something that’s permanent and temporary? But they created these jobs that were permanent and temporary, which basically meant that they could at will fire people from their jobs. So, these aren’t real sound jobs. The wages were low. They did not get great benefits. So, a lot of the promise that was offered was not delivered upon. And that these were primarily the jobs that were provided in this part of Mississippi, despite the millions in tax breaks that Nissan got from, again, the state of Mississippi and the local government there. **VALLAS:** And there’s so many more examples throughout the report. We’ve got a link and show notes so folks can go in and can sort of page through. It’s written in an incredibly accessible way, right? So, I want to just make that point. You intentionally set this up so that you don’t have to be a lawyer to read this. You don’t have to be a deep antitrust expert to be able to read this. This is actually really for people who might be a little bit newer to the issue. And one of the big kind of frames of the report as well is you spend a lot of time discussing how, you know, hey, we know folks are busy. We know folks are **fighting a lot of fights right now** and probably **don’t feel like they’ve got** one more to take on, **space for one more to take on**. **But** you really make the point that for folks who are working on, say, advancing the Green New Deal or the Homes Guarantee or other policies within the social and the economic and the racial justice advocacy sphere, you really make the point that **challenging monopoly power is actually a prerequisite to succeeding in those other fights**. What’s your message to advocates and to activists and policy folks, anyone who’s listening or who might read the report, what’s your message to them about why they should see the anti-monopoly fight as their own, even if they feel like that’s not the space that they work in? **GREER:** Yeah, I mentioned Action Center for Race and the Economy. Mo BP-Weeks, who is a co-director there, often says, You just have to follow the money.” And I think organizers know that when you follow the money, you usually find exactly the targets that you need. And there’s a section in the report called Monopoly Power Is Corporate Power Magnified and Maximized. And we believe, and I think that we’re right, that if you focus in on and treat these monopolies like corporate entities, you can begin to see change in a lot of the transformative movements that people are having, for example, the Green New Deal and efforts to create a more equitable and healthy environment and to curb climate change. You know, the targets are Big Oil and Big Energy. And those institutions, while they’re large, still operate like corporations. They have a CEO, they have Board of Directors, they have shareholders. And all of those people have some stake in the company and have some culpability to the issues that you are trying to solve. So, it becomes another tool in the toolbox. We believe that anti-monopoly advocacy is just another tool in the toolbox that could be used to curb corporate power so that you can **begin to get wins on other issues** that you may be focusing on, whether it is the **environment**, whether it is affordable housing, whether it’s creating higher wages for workers, whether it is to create a safer community free of **police violence**. We think that by focusing on curbing the monopoly power of the corporations that are causing that pain is just another tool that can be used in the advocacy for those broader kind of movement priorities that we hear a lot about. **VALLAS:** Now, one of the things that you and I have talked about a good amount before, and something that we actually get into a lot on this podcast, is the narratives that are out there that we’re often sort of fighting against that might be invisible, but that shape people’s views about, say, the economy and economic policy, even if they’re not aware that that’s the sort of lens that they’re looking through or the pair of glasses that they’re looking through. It’s also something that you really spend a lot of time working on. And it’s very, it’s central, really, to a lot of what Liberation in a Generation is advancing, is narrative change, right? Especially dismantling, for example, the neoliberal narratives that are really at the root of so many of the social injustices that folks who listen to the show are out there fighting every day. You talk about government, in the case of the anti-monopoly fight, as a villain and as complicit with corporations in allowing unchecked corporate power to do the damage that you’ve been talking about, that we’ve been discussing up to this point. But you actually talk about them in the context of the anti-monopoly fight government as the villain who could turn into the hero. Talk about why you think it’s so important to construct a narrative with a villain, with a hero. And we’ll get back now into kind of the policy conversation of this, why government has the potential to turn from being a villain to being a hero in this context. **GREER:** Yeah, I mean, it’s really, when you ~~look at~~ (consider) the **history** of **anti-monopoly advocacy**, you see that **there once was a time where the government was an active participant in curbing corporate power** and was doing so on behalf of workers. You know, you see there were passages of transformative legislation like the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act or the Federal Trade and Commissions Act. And these were all passed in the early 20th century. And they were meant to curb this kind of corporate monopoly power in, you know, back in the Gilded Age when we saw the trust corporations, the railroads, the Carnegie steel industry. And there was this active role of government doing this. But what we’ve seen since then is, as corporate power grew, begin to influence government more, a real devolution of that activist role the government played. And what we began to see really, you know, and probably the heyday of this for the monopolies began in the 1980s and continues on today, was actual collusion between the government and these monopolies. And that what we saw, what we see today is there have been, there were more mergers and acquisitions under Obama administration than any other administration before it. So, we’re at the point now where the government is really seen as a, it’s really a collaborator in building monopoly power. What we need to get back to is a place where the government is playing its role in making sure that not just the, it’s not just about the size of the company, but that the company’s power is not getting to the point where they’re bringing down the standard of living for workers, particularly Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and Asian-American workers. That consumers are seeing the type of prices so that they can afford the things that they need to live a daily life. That small businesses, particularly Black businesses, are not being crowded out. And that that is a role for government. So, **government can be the hero**, and it **should be the hero** because **it is our government**, you know. We are a democracy. We should have say, each and every one of us, in what our government does, and our government should be working on our behalf, not on behalf of Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, or Elon Musk. **We should be expecting the government to play that active role**, and **not just** recognizing that it should be done **for all workers**, but ensuring that workers of color in particular and people of color, households of color **in particular**, are being protected against the tyranny of monopoly power. **VALLAS:** And one of the later chapters in the report really offers kind of a primer in some of that early 20th century history that you were just summarizing around the time when government in the U.S. actually did take action to rein in monopoly power. You mentioned the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, all of that, I would encourage folks to go in and read. And there’s probably a lot that folks don’t know about that era following the gilded era, that really was the time when the federal government in the U.S. did actually take action to check corporate power. Who are the key players with power in the federal government to do something about this? And what are some of the existing solutions that are being advanced? **GREER:** Yeah. So, today, I mean, it’s your Congress, of course, has a lot of power. Because there’s an, I believe, there’s a need for new kind of legislation that new powers be created, new constructions of how we regulate monopoly that only Congress could do by passing laws. But under our current laws, the Federal Trade Commission is responsible for responding and kind of being the first, the cop on the beat to make sure that companies aren’t violating any of our current antitrust laws. They can issue criminal and civil penalties, and they are the ones who are in charge of enforcing those kind of monumental legislation that we’ve talked about. The Justice Department also has a important role in moving legislation forward. In fact, they are the entity that when you hear about breaking up corporations, the Justice Department is the one that usually does that. And they’ve done it in the past. You know, they did it. They broke up the big railroad monopolies of the past, and they broke up AT&T in the 1970s into what they call the Baby Bells. And they currently have a lawsuit today against Google to look at Google’s monopoly power. And in the lawsuit, there’s a call for breaking it up into smaller pieces. So, there’s that. And then there’s other agencies, you know. As it relates to banking, it’s the Department of Treasury with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency, the CFPB in banking. In agriculture, it’s the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In energy, it’s the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. Each of these industries kind of have their own government entity that is responsible for regulating the work that they do. And they play a role in curbing corporate power. And one other one that I’d mention is states. State Attorney Generals also have a lot of power to curb corporate power, because one thing that’s little known is that states are the ones that incorporate corporations. And so, they have a lot of ability and a lot of power to regulate agencies. As far as solutions go, there’s a lot of solutions that are kind of out there. And what this report does not do is propose to put forth a particular solution that would work for people of color, because we actually think that that’s the work that grassroots leaders of color should embark on in the future, is **designing and developing** those **particular solutions**. But some of the solutions that we have in our toolbox today are, for example, breaking up large corporations. That is something that we can do today. We can also regulate, tightly regulate corporations using the existing tools in the toolbox. The CFPB and what it’s done in the banking industry is a good example of that. But one idea that’s been batted around, and I think Elizabeth Warren proposes for big tech in particular, is new enforcement agencies that are more in line with the realities that we see in the economy today and the way in which monopolies form. A lot of our laws are meant, were developed to regulate railroad and steel monopolies, and those aren’t the monopolies that we’re seeing today. So, there is a group of folks out there talking and saying that there’s a real need to think about new agencies with **new authorities that could regulate monopoly power**. **VALLAS:** And of course, it’s **not** exactly **a pie-in-the-sky idea** to think about creating those new agencies. Elizabeth Warren, who you mentioned, right, was the godmother of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CFPB, which is pretty young as far as federal agencies go. It was created during the Obama years. Although that may feel like a different lifetime at this point in a lot of ways. We’re going to run out of time. But the last couple of minutes that we have, I’d really love to spend delving into the recommendation that really is, in a lot of ways, the kind of central call of this report. A lot of it is really addressed to grassroots leaders, and for the reasons you’ve discussed, right, about bridging that divide. But it’s also addressed to the existing anti-monopoly tent: the folks who are already working within research and advocacy spaces on these issues. And you say very pointedly, “The anti-monopoly movement, within **research and advocacy spaces** especially, should embolden grassroots leaders of color to deliver anti-racist policy solutions aimed specifically to curtail monopoly power.” So, there you’re describing that agenda that you think grassroots leaders really should be centered in developing. But you continue. You actually, you sort of raise the ante with this call. You also say, “It’s **not enough** to ~~speak~~ **(argue) virtuously** about racial equity and economic justice. We **have to intentionally center people of color** in the development of **policy change**.” And you call explicitly for a reimagination of this movement through a racial justice lens that broadens the tent and **intentionally makes this work more accessible** and **more human-impact focused** so that it’s not just about bringing folks in and centering the work differently. It’s actually about doing the work differently, entirely, so that it’s **not just that technocratic** and sort of small-tent D.C. **elite approach** to **changing these policies**. Talk a little bit about what that actually would look like. You have some pretty specific ideas that, I agree with you, would actually **transform the anti-monopoly movement** in ways that would **reimagine it** and approach the work differently. Get concrete. What would that actually look like? **GREER:** Yeah, and thank you for this question, Rebecca. You know, I mentioned that history. And I think what we know about public policy and the **history** of public **policy** in the United States, whether it was this antitrust movement in response to the Gilded Age, whether it was the New Deal, is that when it’s done in a **race-neutral** way, it doesn’t just leave people of color behind — Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian Americans — it also **harms people of color**. And what we need to do is, of course, what we **can learn from that history** is that we should **not repeat it**. And we should not repeat it, **by centering people of color as the core beneficiaries** of the **policy**. Because we believe **if that is done**, not only will they be served, but we will all then be served because we’re **ensuring** that we’re **not leaving anyone behind**, and we’re not intentionally harming anyone. And we think that that’s so critically important in this kind of **new era of antitrust policy that could come forth**.

## 1NC

Next OFF is Frame Subtraction:

#### Two links:

#### 1 - The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

Rhetorical resistance

That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.

The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.

The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.

Resistance criticism

Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).

Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).

By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.

What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:

(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.

(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?

(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.

(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.

The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between

resistance and rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical criticism

As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.

The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### 2. Hartman’s *Continuity Thesis* - relies on scholarship is methodologically flawed - relying on the *Slave Narratives Collection*. We are critiquing the methodology, which exploited and changed black stories in favor of Roosevelt’s liberalism - not the aff’s conclusion

Carmody ‘10Todd Carmody – Lecturer on History & Literature at Harvard University, where he teaches nineteenth- and twentieth-century African American and American literatures and in the Modern Europe concentration. Previously, I held an ACLS New Faculty Fellowship in English at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Sheila Biddle Ford Foundation Fellowship from Harvard’s W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research – “STERLING BROWN AND THE DIALECT OF NEW DEAL OPTIMISM” – from the Journal – Callaloo 33.3 (2010) – pages 820-840 – available via the online database entitled Black Studies Center.

In "A Note on Method" appended to the introduction of Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman observes that any effort to reconstruct the past uncovers both "the provisionality of the archive" and the political interests that determine the official emplotment of history (10). Hartman's influential account of the continuities between antebellum and postbellum racial subjugation draws on a decidedly provisional and interested archive: the Slave Narrative Collection compiled by the Federal Writers Project (FWP) during the Depression. Beginning in the late 1930s, the FWP carried out thousands of interviews with ex-slaves, transcriptions of which remain an indispensable yet problematic resource for scholars. As historians have long pointed out, the artifice of direct speech in these purportedly word-for-word transcripts belies a dubious history of intimidation and mediation. Most of the interviews were conducted by southern whites at a time when segregation was in full effect, lynchings still numerous, and peonage sustained by tenor a way of life for millions of African Americans (Woodward 51). Additionally, while some of the interviews were captured on tape, most of the narratives were drafted by interviewers based on notes and then rewritten by higher officials. Testimonies were regularly "doctored," certain portions deleted without indication in the typescript, and the informant's language altered from draft to draft.1 It is with caveats such as these in mind that Hartman notes, even as she draws on the Slave Narrative Collection, that the black voice in these testimonies authorizes "a usable and palatable national past" (10).

#### We can defend the rest of the aff strategy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is best and we can subtract 2AC frames.

#### Only conditional tests of limited agreement incentivize narrow testing of their specific claims. Requiring us to disprove the entire aff forces extreme impact turns that lack nuance and political utility.

#### Nuanced testing is a better model of engagement to improve praxis.

Williams 15 – Douglas Williams, Third-Generation Organizer, BA in Political Science from the University of Minnesota at Morris, MPA from the University of Missouri Columbia, Doctoral Student in Political Science at Wayne State University, internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer at Purdue University and PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue University and MA in English with a Concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, The South Lawn, <https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/> [language modified]

What conversation is there to be had around that? It is as if the mere existence of her identity inoculates her from any critique. How did we get here?

—

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“:

“This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. But critique drift demonstrates why a[n] [effective] ~~healthy~~, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately ~~disarms~~ [undermines] the left. Refusing to say ‘this is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making that accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.”

Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed.

But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

## Case

#### Presumption.

#### The 1AC’s heavy on diagnosis and light on remedy.

#### Much of the 1AC critiques Topicality – but that alone isn’t a reason to affirm. Vote neg on presumption - K Affs still have solvency burdens. It is not clear HOW the aff’s gesture toward “unraveling mimetic desire” discourages the ontological mindsets cited in the 1AC.

#### ( ) Terrefe cards do not K the topic.

Control-F them – neither mentions Anti-Trust – or even economics.

It’s a distinction with a difference – the Aff CAN’T rely on foundational K’s of a Topic they fail to indict.

THIS topic and “its conduits for economic recalibration” are NOT haunted by the afterlife of slavery – at least not according to anything Terrefe advances.

#### Single Theory of Power wrong. Ontology’s wrong - the world’s malleable and ignoring that boosts material violence.

* Offense – ontological claim create Theory-Practice Gaps – boosting material violence for the very identity groupings under discussion;
* Ontology flawed – world is alterable and such changes are practical.

Wilson ‘5

et al; Arthur Wilson, Professor and Chair of Cornell's Dept. of Education, "The Problem of Power," Adult Education Research Conference. #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://newprairiepress.org/aerc/2005/papers/10

In this paper we have started integrating what we have been learning from these various traditions about what power is and how it works. We refrain from arguing for a particular ~~point of view~~ (perspective) because we lack the hubris to believe a total or single theory of power is possible or desirable. Indeed, a key argument we make in this paper is that there are many theories of power, and hence many problems, because power is recursively imbricated in all human interactions. So, one might ask, who cares, why should we endeavor to understand power and its play in our educational work? We suggest two reasons here. First is a practical response. The world is routinely, systematically unjust and power is a major facilitator of inequitable production and distribution of resources, benefits, accesses, etc. Within a general “critical” project, we ~~see~~ (feel) the need to develop more adequate theories of power in order to improve the lives of human beings because much traditional theory (e.g., the three faces) has failed “to fully comprehend the role of power in shaping human life” (Wartenberg, 1992, p. xi). We agree with Wartenberg that too many power theorists have been unable to appreciate the complexities and nuances of power: “power manifests itself as a complex social presence that exists in an intricate network of overlapping and contradictory relations. The task . . . is to provide a conception of power that does justice to its tangled empirical reality while at the same time providing the social theorists with a precise tool for criticizing social practices and institutions. In particular, theories of power must explain the immersion of human beings in nets of power relations that constrain their possibilities while simultaneously uncovering the means by which human beings have the ability to resist and challenge those relations” (1992, p. xix). Thus we wish to promote Wartenberg’s argument for critical social inquiry that develops explanatory language that accounts for the “newly discovered complexity” of power and how it works. Second, following on Wartenberg’s suggestion, we need more than awareness; we need means. Because of the epistemological proclivities of academic adult education (among other conditions too numerous to detail), there is a fundamental problem with the discipline’s theoretical work: the theory-practice gap. That gap has persisted for so long, we now take it for granted. Among many reasons, the theory-gap persists because generally the discipline of adult education lacks a theory of practical action. Isaac provides one example of why a theory of practical action is necessary: “Theories of power . . . should be conceived as interpretative models, developed by social scientists as submitted to the rigors of critical consideration, about social structures which shape human action and distribute the capacities to act among social agents” (1987, p. 75). Neither adult education theory or much of its practice has generally been able to meet such a standard. If we cannot “see” the conditions in which we enact our social practices (like education), then we can have little hope of challenging or changing inequitable ones. This is the larger problem to which this paper is directed although we are only able to set the stage here for such an encounter. If we as a discipline are ever to have important things to ~~say~~(contend) about the work of adult educators, then we have to work towards transcending this gap. So we use the paper to begin developing a more general theory of power (or rather theories) via working toward a theory of practical action that sees power as a central constituent of human educational interaction. Because power is constructed in and through social interactions, it is always alterable and disruptable, hence the importance of understanding and using power in adult education.

#### The Aff’s approach DOES make things uniquely worse - a new wave of Radcial Black Feminist Prag proves material violence is not ontological pre-ordained.

Woodly ‘22

Dr. Deva Woodly is an Associate Professor of Politics at The New School. She is the author of The Politics of Common Sense: How Social Movements Use Public Discourse to Change Politics and Win Acceptance (Oxford University Press, 2015) and Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and the Democratic Necessity of Social Movements (Oxford University Press, 2022). In this journal article, Dr. Woodly is being interviewed by Sarah Leonard - who is the Publisher and Co-Editor of Lux, a magazine of socialist feminism, as well as a member of Dissent’s editorial board, and a contributing editor to the Nation. From the article “The Political Philosophy of Care” - From the Journal – Dissent - Published by University of Pennsylvania Press - Volume 69, Number 1, Winter 2022, pp. 28-35 (Article) – modified for language that may offend - available via Project Muse

Leonard: As this goes to press, we’re looking at all this potential social spending in the Build Back Better bill. Is this legislation part of a vision that you share, or does it feel like plugging holes rather than any kind of reorientation?

Woodly: I’m all for social spending that makes people’s lives better. The child tax credit is not a revolutionary policy, but it is a policy that has lifted half of America’s impoverished children out of poverty, and that matters. What’s being considered in Congress would reduce harm and make it possible for more people to care for themselves and others.

That does not absolve anyone of the need to continue to push to reorient politics away from the notion that having state funds be distributed directly to people creates an “entitlement society.” Instead, some of the people that we have elected recently, like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Cori Bush, are saying that public money should be used for public goods. Period.

We can think in terms of what [the abolitionist activist] Mariame Kaba calls non-reformist reforms. When it comes to child care, even if some people are talking about it just in terms of allowing everybody to go to work, people become used to having affordable child care, which would be frankly a revolutionary change. Once you have a universal, not a targeted, program—targeted programs are not non-reformist reforms, because they’re always vulnerable—you can build upon them in the future. People become accustomed to not suffering.

Leonard: It seems like people are resisting that suffering more and more.

Woodly: This whole so-called labor shortage has a lot of origins. Part of it is a capital strike. But part of it is also about people having realized what [labor journalist] Sarah Jaffe says, that work won’t love you back. People rearranged their lives so that they could survive COVID-19, and having rearranged their lives, lost loved ones, and suffered in various ways, they are making different choices. That is one way that people are choosing to be self-determining. It opens up possibilities for new arguments to be made and new policies to be passed. Even if the Democrats in Congress mess up this bill, which they better not, the fact that it is so popular is also something to be aware of. It’s popular to give people what they need.

Leonard: It does make the right’s case against social programs seem very thin.

Woodly: Albert O. Hirschman wrote in the 1970s that when people in power want to discredit popular ideas, they use a rhetoric of reaction, which has three techniques: perversity, futility, and jeopardy. They would argue that the policy that you want to pass is not really going to help people; it’s going to have perverse effects. Futility means that it’s not really going to help that many people, and we’re going to waste all this time and money. And then the jeopardy argument is that you’re actually going to be endangering the people that you want to help. This has been the right wing’s rhetoric for most of the twentieth century. It’s produced insane arguments, like Paul Ryan saying that children didn’t want free lunch.

I always think about that comment now because of what happened during the COVID-19 era. In my area in New York, school lunches became free. It wasn’t only that it’s good to feed the children; they were also trying to keep jobs for people who otherwise might have been fired. They were trying to spend the money that had been allocated, even though the schools were set to shut down. This confluence of circumstances made it so that people are now used to free lunch. This year, when the children are in school five days a week, their lunches are free.

Leonard: Turns out kids like it.

Woodly: Turns out everybody likes it. You have people like the middle school principal here, *who’s not a revolutionary*, standing up in front of the orientation class at the beginning of the school year saying, “They finally got it right on free lunch.” This is how it moves. There’s not a utopian transformation that happens all at once where everybody ~~sees~~ (notices) the light. It’s these hardscrabble political opportunities, which people are organized to take advantage of, where you move forward an agenda that relieves people of *some* of their *suffering.* That’s how you win.

Leonard: In some places, COVID-19 really showed what productive things the state could actually do.

Woodly: It didn’t only show what the state could do. It also showed what the people do. When we were in lockdown, the largest mass mobilization in American history happened, and that was, in part, because people had the time to get together and to make community. They had the time to be democratic citizens.

Since things have begun to reopen, we have ~~seen~~ (noticed) a very fierce battle from the right to reclaim ground. So even if the school gives free lunch, conservatives argue, they give it with a side of critical race theory. These ideas [like free lunch] are otherwise so popular that they would gain a supermajority that would be hard to overcome.

#### Institutional engagement has made material gain for Black women

Collins 97 – Patricia Hill Collins, Sociology Professor & Chair, Dept. African American Studies, U Cincinnati, 1997, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, p. 134-7

In this academic context, postmodern treatment of power rela­tions suggested by the rubric of decentering may provide some relief to intellectuals who wish to resist oppression in the abstract without decentering their own material privileges. Current preoccupations with hegemony and microlevel, local politics—two emphases within post­modern treatments of power—are revealing in this regard. As the resurgence of interest in Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s work illus­trates (Forgacs 1988), postmodern social theorists seem fascinated with the thesis of an all-powerful hegemony that swallows up all resis­tance except that which manages to survive within local interstices of power. The ways in which many postmodernist theorists use the heterogeneous work of French philosopher Michel Foucault illustrate these dual emphases. Foucault’s sympathy for disempowered people can be seen in his sustained attention to themes of institutional power via historical treatment of social structural change in his earlier works (see., e.g., Foucault’s analysis of domination in his work on prisons [‘979] and his efforts to write a genealogy linking sexuality to institu­tional power [ii98oa]). Despite these emphases, some interpretations of his work present power as being everywhere, ultimately nowhere, and, strangely enough, growing. Historical context is minimized—the prison, the Church, France, and Rome all disappear—leaving in place a decontextualized Foucauldian “theory of power.” All of social life comes to be portrayed as a network of power relations that become increasingly analyzed not at the level of large-scale social structures, but rather at the local level of the individual (Hartsock 1990). The in­creasing attention given to micropolitics as a response to this growing hegemony, namely, politics on the local level that are allegedly plural, multiple, and fragmented, stems in part from this reading of history that eschews grand narratives, including those of collective social movements. In part, this tendency to decontextualize social theory plagues academic social theories of all sorts, much as the richly tex­tured nuances of Marx’s historical work on class conflict (see, e.g., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [1963]) become rou­tinely recast into a mechanistic Marxist “theory of social class.” This decontextualization also illustrates how academic theories “empty out the more political and worldly substance of radical critiques” (West 1993, 41) and thus participate in relations of ruling. In this sense, postmodern views of power that overemphasize hegemony and local politics provide a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing that such efforts are doomed. Hegemonic power appears as ever expanding and invad­ing. It may even attempt to “annex” the counterdiscourses that have developed, oppositional discourses such as Afrocentrism, postmod­ernism, feminism, and Black feminist thought. This is a very impor­tant insight. However, there is a difference between being aware of the power of one’s enemy and arguing that such power is so pervasive that resistance will, at best, provide a brief respite and, at worst, prove ultimately futile. This emphasis on power as being hegemonic and seemingly absolute, coupled with a belief in local resistance as the best that people can do, flies in the face of actual, historical successes. African-Americans, women, poor people, and others have achieved results through social movements, revolts, revolutions, and other col­lective social action against government, corporate, and academic structures. As James Scott queries, “What remains to be explained is why theories of hegemony…have…retained an enormous intel­lectual appeal to social scientists and historians” (1990, 86). Perhaps for colonizers who refuse, individualized, local resistance is the best that they can envision. Overemphasizing hegemony and stressing ni­hilism not only does not resist injustice but participates in its manufacture. Views of power grounded exclusively in notions of hegemony and nihilism are not only pessimistic, they can be dangerous for members of historically marginalized groups. Moreover, the emphasis on local versus structural institutions makes it difficult to examine major structures such as racism, sexism, and other structural forms of oppression.7 Social theories that reduce hierarchical power relations to the level of representation, performance, or constructed phenomena not only emphasize the likelihood that resistance will fail in the face of a pervasive hegemonic presence, they also reinforce perceptions that local, individualized micropolitics constitutes the most effective ter­rain of struggle. This emphasis on the local dovetails nicely with in­creasing emphasis on the “personal” as a source of power and with parallel attention to subjectivity. If politics becomes reduced to the “personal,” decentering relations of ruling in academia and other bu­reaucratic structures seems increasingly unlikely. As Rey Chow opines, “What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the op­pressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand” (1993, 13). Viewing decentering as a strategy situated within a larger process of resistance to oppression is dramatically different from perceiving decentering as an academic theory of how scholars should view all truth. When weapons of resistance are theorized away in this fashion, one might ask, who really benefits? Versions of decentering as presented by postmodernism in the American academy may have limited utility for African-American women and other similarly situated groups. Decentering provides little legitimation for centers of power for Black women other than those of preexisting marginality in actual power relations. Thus, the way to be legitimate within postmodernism is to claim marginality, yet this same marginality renders Black women as a group powerless in the real world of academic politics. Because the logic of decentering opposes constructing new centers of any kind, in effect the stance of critique of decentering provides yet another piece of the new politics of containment. A depoliticized decentering disempowers Black women as a group while providing the illusion of empowerment. Although individual African-American women intellectuals may benefit from being able to broker the language and experiences of marginality in a commodified American academic marketplace, this in no way substi­tutes for sustained improvement of Black women as a group in these same settings. In contrast, groups already privileged under hierarchi­cal power relations suffer little from embracing the language of decen­tering denuded of any actions to decenter actual hierarchical power relations in academia or elsewhere. Ironically, their privilege may ac­tually increase.

#### Prefer contingency

Rinehart ‘16

Nicholas T. Rinehart, Department of English, Harvard University, Lead Coordinator for Graduate Colloquia and co-coordinator of the Race & Ethnicity Graduate Colloquium, Affiliate of the Afro-Latin American Research Institute at the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research, The Man That Was a Thing: Reconsidering Human Commodification in Slavery, Journal of Social History, Volume 50, Number 1, Fall 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/631853

Smallwood’s analysis of these supposed techniques of “commodification” is thus deeply indebted to Orlando Patterson’s concept of social death: “slavery is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”33 Smallwood finds her “middle ground” in this condition—a legally or socially liminal state between initial enslavement and ultimate manumission and an ontologically liminal state between being and nonbeing: physical life without social life, belonging to no social community yet provisionally incorporated within a larger social order. Smallwood’s account is striking in how it maps techniques of “commodification” directly onto Patterson’s articulation of “social death.” The slave’s ontologically liminal space is precisely where “human commodification was possible,” where the slave is “reduced” to “currency” by severed social ties, violent domination, and general maltreatment. Vincent Brown has rightly noted how strict adherence to Patterson’s theory of social death can cause serious interpretive problems in the study of slavery. “It is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey,” Brown writes, “a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.”34 The flaw in Smallwood’s account is that she allows “the condition of social death to stand for the experience of life in slavery.”35 Hence, Smallwood’s (and others’) description of the thoroughly “dehumanized” or “commodified” slave is largely ahistorical; it maps itself directly onto a sociological abstraction, leaving no room for historical contingency or local variation. It presumes the outcome of “commodification” and describes all aspects of enslavement as constituting or producing that outcome. Indeed, the question that looms over all this analysis is: What aspects of Atlantic slavery, if any, might not have contributed to human “commodification?” If we suppose that captives were bought and sold along the west coast of Africa but that they were reasonably well fed, would these captives still be “commodified?” If slaves were not segregated by sex aboard slave ships, would they still be “commodified?” What if captives were kept in prisons, but not held in chains—would that make a difference? Analyses of the transatlantic slave trade like that above confuse historical contingency with theoretical fact. If anything, Smallwood’s emphasis on the biological aspect of “commodification” undermines the very concept itself. Smallwood writes that, “Because human beings were treated as inanimate objects, [End Page 35] the number of bodies stowed aboard a ship was limited only by the physical dimensions and configuration of those bodies.”36 This assertion that “human beings were treated as inanimate objects” contradicts the earlier statement that slave traders “reduced people to the sum of their biological parts.” How can something be both biological and inanimate? And more, when Smallwood claims that slave merchants were “probing the limits up to which it is possible to discipline the body without extinguishing the life within,” she is also revealing slavers’ recognition of the continued physical vitality and biological life of the slave. Patterson himself states this outright: “A dead slave, or one incapacitated by brutalization, was a useless slave.”37 In defining the power relation internal to slavery, Patterson further observes that “Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of the slave’s powerlessness was that it always originated . . . as a substitute for death, usually violent death.”38 And this is because slaves can die.39 I contend that even the horrific practices of starvation, torture, and other forms of “psychic and social” violence enacted upon slaves reveal a profound investment in and acknowledgement of the humanity of enslaved people by their enslavers. I use the word “investment” intentionally and ironically to argue that perpetrators of slavery, rather than treating slaves simply as inanimate things, marketable products, or exchangeable commodities—as things—understood them as thoroughly human. “Scientific” efforts to starve African captives rely on the presumption that captives can be starved. To violently subject captives to “unmitigated poverty” and deprive them of their social and familial ties is to make the fundamental concession that enslaved Africans could be violently subjected to poverty, that they could be deprived of social and familial ties. One cannot alienate a cowrie shell or starve a bale of cotton. This social fact is most evident when we venture beyond the representational mode of “commodification” and into the realm of everyday human contact. The exact terms in which Patterson defines “social death” confirm this much: If the slave is violently dominated, natally alienated, and generally dishonored, then we must recognize that only a human can be so dominated, so alienated, and so dishonored. As Patterson writes, “The counterpart of the master’s sense of honor is the slave’s experience of its loss. The so-called servile personality is merely the outward expression of this loss of honor.”40 This “experience . . . of loss” implies the loss of something that was once there. In sum, Smallwood’s stunning account of the Middle Passage—surely the best we have in the literature on slavery—would be enriched by redirecting analytical attention to how this particular historical process hinged upon, rather than depleted, the humanity and vulnerability of its victims. A Better Model: Commodity-as-Process Historians of slavery striving to demonstrate the “commodification” of enslaved people have been led astray by strict adherence not only to Patterson’s “social death” but also to Marx’s theory of the commodity. In his discussion of the United States’ internal slave trade and the sexual abuse of enslaved women, Edward Baptist constructs a theory of commodification that marries Marx’s commodity fetishism with Freud’s sexual fetishism. This theoretical framework is [End Page 36] troubling from the start, if only because Marx’s formulation of the commodity and commodity fetishism is arguably inapplicable here. According to Marx, “This Fetishism of commodities has its origin . . . in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them.”41 And when Marx mentions “labour,” we should assume that he does not mean the reproductive sort. Indeed, Marx’s entire conception of the commodity as social use-value is grounded in the dynamic between human labor on one side and human want on the other. The commodity as social use-value is determined by the quantity of human labor embodied within it, representing the labor-time socially necessary for its production. Commodities are “only definite masses of congealed labour-time.”42 Marx’s articulation of commodity fetishism is thus not particularly suited to the perception or treatment of enslaved people. Baptist’s ensuing examination of the “commodification” of enslaved people—regarding the slave sale or auction, and the rape of enslaved women—demonstrates the instability of this rhetoric. In the first case, Baptist describes the “deanimation of enslaved people” as “virtually inanimate articles”43 and their subsequent “reanimation” as a “lifeless commodity”44 when they are made to pose, flex their muscles, dance, and play instruments or card games in slave pens where traders meticulously examined their bodies. Slaves were made “to demonstrate their salability by outwardly performing their supposed emotional insensibility and physical vitality,”45 as Walter Johnson writes of Louisiana slave markets. Baptist does not, however, see the apparent contradiction here—that slavers were invested in, dependent upon, the fundamentally human liveliness of their captives. Slaves were not just “reanimated” as “market myths”46 but as flesh capable of withstanding immense suffering. More central to Baptist’s amalgam of commodity and sexual fetishism is the frequent rape of enslaved women by slave traders. Several conclusions emerge from his discussion of the slave market and sexual abuse: first, that enslaved women were regarded by their traders as “impassioned”47 objects; second, that traders used these objects to satisfy their sexual desires, to assert their masculinity, to “erase dependence” and “forget fears”48 by exerting control over them; and third, that this capacity for sexual objectification was bought and sold in the slave markets of the United States. I maintain, on the contrary, that such historical instances of rape and sexual abuse do not signify the objectification of enslaved women. It seems rather that slave traders took pleasure in the inability of their “fancy maids” to express sexual consent. This powerlessness on the part of women who were not “people whose opinions must be considered” suggests that these women had opinions that were disregarded, that they had control or power over their lives and bodies that was suppressed. To take such pleasure in the displeasure, the lack of consent, the powerlessness of another is—perhaps counterintuitively—to recognize the humanity of that person. Baptist’s brilliant analysis of slave trader correspondences, specifically showing how their coded language of sexual conquest represented enslaved women as “commodities,” is less convincing in the material (and nonrepresentational) realm of everyday intimacy. Slavers were always deeply invested in slaves’ necessarily human—“frail, sentient, resistant”49—capacity for suffering.50 Such analytical inconsistencies are caused not only by the reductive “neo-abolitionist” ways we think about slavery but also by the rigid application of inadequate theoretical models. Simply put, Marx’s conception of the commodity does [End Page 37] not work in such studies, perhaps because its static quality does not sufficiently describe a historical experience that is thoroughly processual. As a possible remedy, I suggest that historians of slavery adopt Igor Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process. This model is best suited to our field of inquiry because it reflects the lived experience of enslavement itself. We first must acknowledge that “slavery” refers to a vast and nebulous web of associations and histories. Modern racial slavery, as a world-historical phenomenon, had many moving parts. From the coasts of Africa, to the Atlantic Middle Passage, to the shores of the New World, to the plantations and cities of the Americas, back and forth throughout the internal slave routes—the life of a single slave often comprised an accumulated series of various forms of enslavement. Any one of these stages might vary greatly. As Walter Johnson writes, the “daily process of the slave trade” involved “Many slaves trades, many versions of what was happening [that] met and were contested in every sale.”51 In order best to understand how “slavery” varied so widely across time and space—how slaves often passed between different modes of enslavement—we must embrace an appropriately flexible and contingent theoretical model. I would suggest further that the very word “slavery” itself is meaningless insofar as it attempts to describe abstractly what was historically a set of changing, disparate, and transitional circumstances and experiences.52 That is, enslavement was always profoundly processual in nature—but not just in the sense of bondage and freedom, life and death, being and nonbeing. It was so with respect to itself, with respect to the mundane life of the slave, with respect to the multiple slaveries endured by any single man or woman throughout a lifetime. Kopytoff acknowledges this precisely: “What we see in the career of a slave is a process of initial withdrawal from a given original social setting, his or her commoditization, followed by increased singularization (or decommoditization) in the new setting, with the possibility of later recommoditization.”53 This approach enables us to envision the slave not as a static, “commodified” entity but rather as a social figure that moves through various phases of expulsion, marginality, and reincorporation. Kopytoff’s formulation is also particularly useful for re-examining the contexts of Smallwood’s and Baptist’s work, respectively—the slave market (whether on the Gold Coast or in the American South) and the plantation. Commodity-as-process suggests that “The only time when a commodity status of a thing is beyond question is the moment of actual exchange.”54 Beyond the singular, ephemeral moment of purchase, the enslaved subject is then “decommoditized” in a process Kopytoff calls “singularization,” though often (if not always) able to be “recommoditized.” As such, the enslaved person in whatever context becomes a “potential commodity,” endowed with “an exchange value even if they have been effectively withdrawn from their exchange sphere and deactivated, so to speak, as commodities.”55 In the parlance of our historiography, this is the chattel principle; Kopytoff helps us understand how the plantation laborer, for example, is not definitionally a “commodified” individual but rather a “potential commodity.”56 Commodity-as-process skirts the theoretical and historical pitfalls of the so-called “commodification” of enslaved humanity in four ways. First, it productively revises a strictly Marxian conception of the commodity-fetish.57 Second, the observation that the commodity only truly exists in the “moment of actual exchange” enables us to realize that torture, starvation, and rape—the total [End Page 38] brutalization of the slave—is predicated on the presumed humanity of the victim. Third, it provides a manner of speaking about the “commoditization” of enslaved people without resorting to the normative impulses found in the historiographical opposition between person and thing. And finally, it is thoroughly historical. Miller urges that the global history of enslavement be rethought as a “historical process.”58 Slaving, he writes, was a strategy, not a sociological abstraction or simply an “institution.” And he reminds us that the study of enslavement should focus explicitly on humans and humans acting in order to go “beyond the passivity of suffering and domination.”59 Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process offers a suitable vocabulary and theoretical toolkit to meet such an occasion. We might consider, for example, how such framing might have enhanced Smallwood’s account of the successive processes of “turning African captives into Atlantic commodities” and “turning Atlantic commodities into American slaves,” where instead of the sociological flattening of “social death” we had the dynamism of Kopytoff’s description of the multi-phased career of the slave. We might also consider how, from this perspective, the slave auction in Baptist’s analysis might render the slave “commoditized” yet not necessarily “lifeless,” positioned interstitially such that the commodity status of the slave can be reactivated, deactivated, or potentialized without becoming permanent, definitional, or ontological. Commodity-as-process thus enables us to imagine historical enslavement in new ways that do not make recourse to such static and normative paradigms buttressed by “social death,” Marxian commodity fetish, or any other inadequate theoretical position. Reparative Semantics? That we might come to understand enslavement as thoroughly processual has been highlighted by recent scholarship describing the so-called “second slavery.” This work maintains that there was a fundamental transformation in the scalar, geographical, and technological aspects of slavery in the nineteenth century that made it both specifically modern and capitalistic. Atlantic slavery was thus reconfigured by the production of new staple commodities (especially cotton) in unprecedented quantities, the sweeping migration of enslaved people as well as slaveholders to regions previously marginal to the Atlantic economy (the Deep South, western Cuba, the interior of Jamaica, and south-central Brazil, among others), the incorporation of biological and technological innovations for harvesting crops, and a newfound reliance on often excessive financial speculation.60 The “second slavery” importantly “calls attention to the continual re-formation of slavery”61 and demonstrates conclusively, if somewhat ambiguously, the mutual historical embeddedness of racial slavery and the advent of global capitalism. Indeed, the relevant question for historians of slavery is no longer whether slavery was capitalistic—as it may have been for previous generations of scholars who emphasized the premodern, feudalistic, and paternalist aspects of American slavery—but precisely how and why (and when) slavery and capitalism converged so forcefully. Yet there are still analytical hurdles to overcome in parsing the relation between slavery and capitalism. As John J. Clegg observes, one central problem running throughout this new scholarship is the refusal to define capitalism itself. While several scholars have given names to the phenomena they describe—Walter Johnson’s “slave-racial capitalism” and Sven Beckert’s “war capitalism” [End Page 39] come immediately to mind—Clegg notes that “by dodging the problem of definition altogether they fail to provide a coherent account of capitalist slavery.”62 Another unresolved tension in this body of work is the conjunction of historical process and transformation with a critical vocabulary, as described above, that is insufficiently dynamic. Resorting to the concept of enslaved “commodification” in order to highlight the “dehumanizing” features of a highly profitable and financially sophisticated system of production based on unfree labor—in short, that this new kind of slavery “was tightly linked to the intensity and profits of industrial capitalism”63—belies the profound rupture at the heart of the “second slavery.” If we can speak of the “commodified” slave in both seventeenth-century Africa and nineteenth-century Mississippi, then it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that “the second slavery defines a distinct period of Atlantic history.”64 Moreover, the repeated emphasis on the increasingly strict and, in many cases, tortuous work regimes that compelled enslaved people to produce cotton and sugar in unprecedented quantities at an unprecedented rate in the nineteenth century reveals again slaveholders’ profound investment in the laboring, suffering body of the slave. This burgeoning research on mass slavery and its capitalistic aspects would be strengthened by increased attention to how such historical transformations—clearly resonant with a Kopytoffian vocabulary—did not signal the erosion of enslaved peoples’ humanity but rather were built upon it. In addition, this newfound emphasis on slave exploitation and the onset of modern industrial capitalism has resuscitated debates about the language of history. Recent writing has urged the substitution of the phrase “enslaved person” for the word “slave.” One article suggests we opt for “enslaved person” because such historical subjects were “humans first, commodities second,” thereby “restoring identity, reversing a cascade of institutional denials and obliterations.” “Slave,” on the other hand, is allegedly a “nonhuman noun.”65 This argument is not new. Deborah Gray White writes in the preface to the revised edition of her seminal study Ar’n’t I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South (1999) that were she to rewrite her book, she would opt for “enslaved” rather than “slave”: “The noun ‘slave’ suggests a state of mind and being that is absolute and unmediated by an enslaver. ‘Enslaved’ says more about what happened to black people without unwittingly describing the sum total of who they were.”66 This same rhetoric was later echoed by Daina Ramey Berry, who writes that, “I prefer to use the term ‘enslaved’ rather than ‘slave’ because it forces us to consider that bondpeople did not let anyone ‘own’ them. They were enslaved against their will.”67 More recently, such semantic choices have been championed by Baptist—who opts for “enslavers” rather than “slaveowner” or “slavemaster”68—and Gregory O’Malley, who writes in his Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619-1807 (2014) that “the historian [has] little to work with in the quest for more humanizing descriptors. To avoid endless repetition of the commodified term slave, I will often refer to those carried in the slave trade as Africans or simply as people.”69 As above, somehow the word “slave” has become “nonhuman” and “commodified,” thereby implying an ontological status of nonbeing thrust upon captive Africans against their will. The repeated idiom of enslaved “commodification” has thus sneakily embedded itself into the language of scholarly inquiry. The implied conclusion of such lexical uneasiness is that these historical persons were not actually slaves at all: “Enslavers” mistook their captives for “slaves,” whose nonextinguishable humanity made the “inhuman” project impossible simply [End Page 40] by means of their continued existence. But are there really such damned connotations to the word “slave,” which surely does not describe an ontological status at all (unless one forces it to), and is there such emancipatory potential in the phrase “enslaved person?”70 These efforts at developing a new glossary for the study of slavery seem not just convoluted and self-gratifying but also profoundly ahistorical. They demonstrate how a mere semantic quip becomes the basis for normative posturing and a shallow attempt at reparative historiography. The way to a more lucid account of the history of enslavement is not by investing analytical or explanatory weight in synonyms, it is by being more precise about what we talk about when we talk about slavery.

# 2NC

#### FOURTH, EXPOSURE ALONE FAILS---they cannot explain why exposing teams to information or opinions facilitates mindset shifts or comprehension---it’s the fallacy of every lecture hall---there’s a difference between showing the facts, and internalizing and applying them---that’s Baker AND…

Halonen ‘11

Dr. Jane S. Halonen is a Professor teaching introductory, positive, and social psychology, and has dedicated her academic career to the scholarship of Teaching and Learning. Her academic interests include improving Student Learning and assessing Undergraduate Programs. This chapter was written by Jane S. Halonen, University of West Florida. From Chapter 21: “Teaching Thinking” – From the Book: McKeachie's Teaching Tips: Strategies, Research, and Theory for College and University Teachers - page 308-9 – This book has been re-released in multiple updated editions. This version is the Thirteenth Edition and reads “Copyright 2006, 2011” - #E&F - modified for language that may offend - available at: https://fdocuments.in/document/mckeachies-teaching-tips-strategies-research-and-theory-for-college-and.html

History credits Plutarch with the observation that "the mind is not a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled." This statement elegantly captures differing attitudes of educators about their overarching objectives in higher education. 'Filling vessels" has been the dominant strategy that most college students experience. However, in the last few decades, widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of college graduates produced new pressures for higher educators to adopt Plutarch's philosophy of education. Barr and Tagg (1995) described and promoted this paradigm shift with their differentiation of content-centered instruction vs. learner-centered instruction.

Content-centered teachers share important facts and concepts with students and show limited attention to the process. Many content-centered teachers believe that merely exposing students to the ideas of the discipline will facilitate changes in students' thinking over time. Content-centered teachers often credit students' innate intelligence as responsible for their academic success. Therefore, it doesn't make much sense to invest valuable class time concentrating on process rather than using available class time to explore the important concepts, theories, or frameworks of the discipline.

*In contrast,* learner-centered teachers ~~embrace~~ (endorse) the responsibility for fostering changes in students' thinking skills. They believe that students grappling with ideas will lead to more meaningful and enduring learning. Factual knowledge will rapidly deteriorate unless the ideas can be meaningfully encoded or practiced with some regularity (Eriksen, 1983). Consequently, learner-centered teachers regularly turn to active learning strategies to engage students in process. Cognitive scientists report that when students think about material in more meaningful ways, underlying brain structures will change to promote more enduring learning (Leamnson, 2000). As a consequence, most colleges and universities now routinely promise the improvement of students' thinking as an explicit goal of the mission. Improving thinking is sometimes couched in terms of objectives to promote critical thinking or problem-solving skills (Halpern, 1996).

#### Psychoanalysis args are wrong.

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The psychological dimensions of resignation to race are counter pointed by immediate technological and political issues. The molecularisation of racial differences and the shift towards genomics suggest that this order of natural difference is becoming more not less important. Recently, the popular authority of commentators as diverse as the academics (Steven Pinker, James Watson) Niall Ferguson and George Steiner and the journalist Max Hastings has combined to translate ***what they take to be*** the latest fruits of resurgent racial science into the iron laws of middlebrow scientific commonsense. This suggests that as a species we are "hard wired" to prefer those who are like us from those who are alien - an outcome which fits tidily with the outlook of people who already believe that the primary human disposition towards others is essentially conflictual and selfish. In the Guardian, Ferguson cited Anders Olsson, a US-based neurobiologist of fear, to the effect that we must sternly if somewhat ambivalently confront the persistent power of race lodged in our genetic makeup. Hastings asserted that only "the idiot Left could deny" the reality of the simple truths involved in the workings of a "tribalism ... which has influenced mankind since the beginning of time". George Steiner, sometime custodian of lofty cosmopolitan and humanistic values, offered to the readers of a Spanish newspaper his opinion that racism was inherent in everyone and racial tolerance only skin-deep. He staged the argument in the midst of a curious fantasy deeply marked by a peculiarly British idiomatic engagement with the consequences of mass economic settlement from the commonwealth after 1945: "It is very easy to sit here in this room and say racism is horrible", Steiner told his interviewer. "But ask me the same thing if a Jamaican family moved next door with six children and they play reggae and rock music all day. Or if an estate agent comes to my house and tells me that because a Jamaican family has moved next door the value of my property has fallen through the floor. Ask me then!" Steiner's Jamaicans can be seen as bastards in the venerable Caribbean lineage that descends from Montaigne's Cannibals. They seem to be curious, timeworn creatures. It is impossible not to wonder what layers of meaning were at stake in that particular national or perhaps ethnic designation "Jamaican"? What is its relationship to the tacit language of polite race-talk on the one hand and the inflammatory mythology of populist-nationalist race-talk on the other? Would the grim situation Steiner describes be substantively different if the aliens living noisily next door were Trinidadian or Barbadian; Bangladeshi, Croatian or Surinamese? If they were Polish, German, French or Swiss? If they had immigrated to Britain like Steiner himself for academic rather than manual work? To make the point more bluntly, what exactly is the sign "reggae" contributing to his horrible scenario, particularly when rendered equivalent to all the cold, brutal savagery that is bound up with the contemptuous word "rock" in this aggressively high-cultural context? Would opera, polkas, tangos, accordion or country and western music have produced the same rhetorical and necro-political effects? Steiner is on record elsewhere as having told a roomful of Asian and African academics that the "third world could not afford the luxury of universities". I'm especially troubled by the great humanist's implication that his repeating this particular mantra -- which has, after all, supplied the imaginative staging of racist, ultranationalist and anti-immigrant rants for almost three generations -- was somehow a difficult thing to do. Perhaps his difficulty resided not merely in the illiberal act of speaking on behalf of wounded folk outside the ivory tower, but in the specific discomfort of operating across the lines of class and privilege which were quietly being inscribed here. The journalist, Sir Max Hastings, defended Steiner's remarks in the Daily Mail and supported that interpretation as he spun off into a strange ventriloquism of his sometime cleaning lady who, he explained, felt similarly aggrieved by what she was expected to tolerate at the hands of immigrants: "A heavenly cockney cleaner named Elsie Elmer worked for our family for almost 40 years. Elsie was a widow, a Londoner through and through. When she was 77, she suddenly announced that she could no longer endure life in Hammersmith, where on both sides of her little house Jamaican neighbours played music full-blast through the night, every night. One day, I drove her to the airport to emigrate to Australia, where she had a son living. She hated to go and wept buckets. But she felt that her street, her city, were no longer the places which she knew and loved." Hastings revealed that he was both more typically and more melancholically English when he presaged his damning, illiberal verdict with the words: "I'm not proud of it but human nature DOES sometimes make us all racist", an opening that caught my attention for its downbeat admission of shame. For all of these voices, racial differences may have been given initially by nature but they are subsequently worked over, worked on and worked up in the social and phenomenological patterns of performative, everyday interaction. I understand the complexity and insistent, iterative power of those habits but my point -- which needs to be repeated -- is that, even when it comes to the "white working class", it is from those social and historical relations that the groups we call races emerge to make the idea of unbridgeable natural difference powerful and plausible. All one-way constructionism -- in which natural difference precedes, underpins and orchestrates subsequent social divisions -- is an inadequate tool with which to make sense of the social life of races and other ethno-political actors. Natural difference does not merely supply source material for social and historical modifications which may be either bad or good. Race has always been the particular, historical product of dense and complex interactive processes rooted in war, conquest, slavery and suffering. This change of perspective builds upon and hopefully extends the dynamic nominalism identified by Ian Hacking for whom named kinds and things are altered by their interactive historical and social correspondence with the processes and institutions that name them. As far as the history of race, raciality and raciology are concerned, that interplay has involved a range of different institutions of naming: theological, occult, military, economic, commercial, legal, scientific, technological and aesthetic. These institutional settings and their ways of seeing and acting on the world may be in profound conflict. But idea of race helped to synchronise and focus them. That is why we should be wary of imagining that the particular pragmatic understanding of race associated with the worlds of science and bio-medicine can be sealed off from racial discourse found in other areas of social and political life. If we decide that it is desirable to communicate the findings and practices from those institutions in the contested language of race, the best we can hope for is that the old ambiguities will be maintained. In the current climate, it is more likely that they will be deepened and amplified. After more than two centuries of scientific mystification, duplicity and bad faith, and against the often hyperbolic rhetoric of the genomic revolution, we do not yet know how nature conditions the social lives, risks and fates of racialised and ethnic groups. It should be obvious that science is not immune to the mysterious psychological appeal of racial truths and racial certainties. There are communities of scientists for whom alterity may still be "phobogenic" and "a stimulus to anxiety" just as there are others for whom the vindication of racial probity and the struggle against racism loom large in their own research. Sociogenetics Some years ago, Fanon tried to specify the limits of the economic and psychological processes that created racialised actors mired in the epidermalising mechanisms of an inferiority which was basically economic in origin. He called this supplementary process "sociogeny". His conceptual breakthrough has been systematized by the Jamaican philosopher Sylvia Wynter who contrasts the resulting socio-genetic analytics of race and humanity with the emergent genomic perspective that is increasingly familiar to us. All varieties of racial discourse share some features. It bears repetition that they work best with a Manichaean script. The forms of political ontology they solicit and promote have, as we have seen, a distinctive psychological appeal. They construct a variety of hyper-similarity that trumps all other ideas of deep association and primal connectedness with all the force of Darwinian nature which was fortuitously and catastrophically articulated together with the power of colonial and imperial history. The wrongs that racial hierarchy has accomplished may not be unique in character but their scale and their recurrence demand a specific acknowledgement. Hannah Arendt, who was much more interested in the corrosive idea of race than in the workings of racism -- which she judged to be normal and understandable where civilized people were confronted with savagery -- can help to move our discussion forward. The philosophical influence of Eric Voegelin over Arendt's thinking in this area was strong. She built upon his insight into the workings of race and the best approach to opposing racial hierarchies and the forms of law and governance that they promoted. Voegelin had been both early and acute in seeing that a narrow, exclusively epistemological critique of race would always miss the point. This is something we still need to remember. Better, that is more accurate, information about the quality of racial difference may be necessary but will never be sufficient to interrupt the special power of this unique political idea. He continues: "As a matter of fact, the race idea with its implications is not a body of knowledge organized in systematic form, but a political idea in the technical sense of the word. A political idea does not attempt to describe social reality as it is, but it sets up symbols, be they single language units or more elaborate dogmas, which have the function of creating the image of a group as a unit .... A symbolic idea like the race idea is not a theory in the strict sense of the word. And it is beside the mark to criticize a symbol, or a set of dogmas, because they are not empirically verifiable. While such criticism is correct, it is with-out meaning, because it is not the function of an idea to describe social reality, but to assist in its constitution. An idea is always ‘wrong' in the epistemological sense, but this relation to reality is its very principle." In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt extended this style of thought and concluded one section of argument with the observation that racism amounts to the death of humanity: "Racism may indeed carry out the doom of the western world and, for that matter, of the whole of human civilization. When Russians have become Slavs, when Frenchmen have assumed the role of commanders of a force noire, when Englishmen have become ‘white men', as already for a disastrous spell all Germans became Aryans, then this change will itself signify the end of western man. No matter what the learned scientists may say, race is, politically speaking, not the beginning of humanity but its end, not the origin of peoples but their decay, not the natural birth of man but his unnatural death." There is something fundamental and significant about Arendt's formulation when it comes to the relationship between racism and humanity. Modern race-thinking was born from the connection between enlightenment anthropology and the formal declarations of equality that necessitated a new rationalization for growing social and economic inequality. That new system was grounded in nature and incorporated the body. Novel ways of making bodies (which were often reluctant) disclose the inner truths of their racial character were the outcome. Along with skin, skulls, pelvic bones, genitals, beards and blood, cells were components of a semiotic economy which fostered progress from race as type to race as genealogy. I have already argued that a history of mass death links colonial government to the later, exceptional spaces in which Europeans industrialised the killing of other racially-unfit Europeans, an event that marked the demise of that same creature: Man. Race and racism are still toxic to humanity and they still matter because they afford an opportunity to discover and to contest the boundaries of the human. Race and racism tell us now that, once again in the words of Sylvia Wynter, we should be prepared to return to the problem of the human after the death of man. We must hold on tightly to the history of race as a trope and use our familiarity with the damage done by racism to license a new engagement with the human that will be conducted in the interests of those previously relegated to the zone of infra-humanity. Their struggles have provided a way to deepen and enrich our democracy. They are now intrinsic to the important idea of Human Rights. Nowadays, nobody respectable speaks about class inequality. A consequence of globalisation as Americanisation and related shifts in European academic culture is the novel currency of a language in which racialised concepts provide an avowedly futuristic way to speak about inequality, segregation, social capital and trust. Against claims to the contrary made by Barak Obama and Condoleezza Rice, the US does not represent the future of everyone else on earth with regard to race. There are other paths, other possibilities and they are not arranged in a neat sequence in which unsustainable north American standards provide an ethical benchmark. Today's postcolonial transition attends the break up of Europe's old imperial system and sees commercial and governmental power ebbing from the north Atlantic and finding new centres elsewhere. Whether there will be a universalisation of US sourced categories and assumptions about race and nature remains to be seen. My guess is, that even during Obama's presidency, when the value of African American culture has been changed and so much of the software of negative globalisation and its infotainment telesector has been drawn from African American life, that is very, very unlikely. The end of Euro-American domination of the planet is at hand. For Europe's national states, reckoning with the aftershock of a departed imperial prestige that is routinely disavowed and symptomatically unacknowledged, has become an essential precondition for the establishment of the habitable multiculture that will be required to sustain an assault on racism and racialised inequalities (even if the word race is not being used). That overdue reckoning is being stubbornly obstructed by a civilisationist discourse which is often little more than the global export of the institutional fruits of conflict born inside the US (Huntington and Lewis, for example) where we were told that glimpses of our inevitable racial destination were being mirrored in the exotic celebrity first of Rice and Powell and now of Obama. These changes cannot plausibly be grasped through the idea of civilisational clash and cultural conflicts between the west and the rest. However, exactly that notion has been consolidated as the primary mechanism of contemporary racialised explanation. It associates the appearance of home grown terrorists with the riots in Paris and the north of England, the Danish cartoons, the murder of Van Gogh, the wars in Afghanistan and Mesopotamia, the war on terror and the geo-politics of a securitocracy which has built upon but surpassed earlier anxieties over immigration. The clash of civilizations becomes both more believable and more comforting in the contexts of information deficit and manufactured ignorance. This too poses ethical and political challenges. Our alternative, critical standpoint has to move beyond a naïve, quantitative faith in the power of better information. Assuming that racialised knowledge can simply be corrected by more accurate facts will do nothing to undo the distinctive powers it is bound up with. With regard to securitocracy, racial discourse can be thought as contributing to the tendency to create exceptional spaces and populate them with vulnerable, infra-human beings. It was colonial battlefields that gave birth to the slave plantations which point in turn to the legal regimes of protective custody that generated and generalized the concentration camp as a routine exception. The governmental dynamics of settler colonialism were also distinctive, especially when colonies provided a laboratory for new ways of governing, killing and judging. In example after example, racial hierarchy and the domination of a large number of people by a much smaller number with a greater measure of force set up particular patterns which were often re-imported into the metropolitan hubs of empire. Police and military powers were merged. The problems that those states of exception posed for citizenship and the language of political rights had been recognized long before they assumed twentieth-century form and Arendt, casting around to uncover the causality of industrialized genocide in Europe, made them relevant to political theory. Again by following her, we can consider the role of race and ethnic absolutism in securing the modes of inclusive exclusion that characterize what we may one day have to call the age of rendition. Understanding the ways in which invoking race has compromised and corrupted politics can also, counter-intuitively, show that the political actors we have learned to name as races derive from the very racial discourse that appears initially to be their product. Happily, there are other dynamic traditions dedicated to making race and racism part of the pre-history of humanity. The global, cold war poetics of Ethiopianism is just one example of how the word human was blasted out of its UNESCO context and set to work. A vernacular universality -- globalised by the generation of Curtis Mayfield and Bob Marley -- began with a transcendental commitment to an alternative order but that is not where it ended. Profane, demotic appeals to the idea of rights made humanity take on new life especially when it was lodged in the orbit of anti-racist and anti-imperialist thought. Then, just as Fanon had hoped, the human alienation associated with racial divisions could be replaced by non-racial alternatives that suffer, love, act and exercise their will and imagination in reshaping the broken world we have inherited. That world corroded by racism cannot be easily repaired and we must learn to suffer the consequences of its fractured condition but as we proceed with our discussion it is good to remember that we always enjoy more power to re-shape it than we often allow ourselves to believe.

#### Psycho-analysis over-explains

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

#### TVA’s can engage the Res and break from ontological error replication and historic inaccessibility

**Greer & Vallas ‘21**

(**Jeremie Greer**, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director at Liberation in a Generation, a national movement support organization building the power of people of color to totally transform the economy, Soros Equality Fellow, racial justice activist who began his career as a community organizer in the Columbia Heights and Shaw neighborhoods in Washington, DC, and national policy expert on the causes and the policy solutions to close racial wealth gap, formerly working at the Government Accountability Office, the Local Initiative Support Corporation, and Prosperity Now (formerly CFED), MPP George Mason University, BA Social Work, University of St. Thomas, currently working on an Executive Education Certificate in Nonprofit Leadership from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government; interviewed by **Rebecca Vallas**, senior fellow at The Century Foundation, work focuses on economic justice, formerly spent seven years at the Center for American Progress, built and lead CAP’s Poverty to Prosperity Program, and helped to establish CAP’s Disability Justice Initiative, the first disability policy project at a U.S. think tank, as well as the organization’s criminal justice reform work, her policy and advocacy work flows from her years as a legal aid lawyer, representing low-income individuals and families at Community Legal Services in Philadelphia, creator and host of Off-Kilter, a nationally distributed podcast about poverty, inequality, and everything they intersect with, JD University of Virginia, BA psychology, Emory University; “Reimagining Anti-Monopoly Activism Through Racial Justice — feat. Liberation in a Generation’s Jeremie Greer,” Off-Kilter Podcast, 3-26-2021, Modified for language that may offend - https://offkiltershow.medium.com/reimagining-anti-monopoly-activism-through-racial-justice-feat-e3a124c1c61)

**VALLAS:** And I want to quote you, because you offer, I think, a really, really smart definition here in the report. You say, “We define monopoly as a corporate entity — a single corporation, or a group of corporations — whose sheer size and anti-competitive behavior grant it disproportionate economic power and governing influence.” And as you’ve been describing, you say, “This negatively affects the well-being of workers, consumers, markets, local communities, democratic governance, and the planet.” That’s a somewhat broader definition than maybe the sort of technical antitrust definition of monopoly. But for all the reasons you’re starting to get into, you really, you argue in this report that it’s necessary that we think a little more broadly and a little more functionally about who’s operating like a monopoly, and therefore where we need to be thinking about challenging unchecked corporate power.

You’ve already started to delve into the link between unchecked corporate power, monopolistic behavior, and the numerous types of racial injustice and structural racism that run rampant throughout the U.S. economy and our broader society. But you have a very powerful way that you phrase this in this report. You say, “Racial wealth inequality,” and you specifically are talking there about racial wealth inequality, “is the consequential disease caused by the oppression economy.” I can’t remember reading another publication about monopolistic behavior and the need for an anti-trust movement that draws such a **direct causal link** between **monopolies** and the ways that they operate, and **racial wealth inequality** and **structural racism**. Talk a little bit about how monopolies are contributing to the immense and historic levels of racial wealth inequality that folks are maybe more familiar with, but not aware of that link.

**GREER:** Yeah. No, thanks for that question. And what I think of an important distinction around the framing there is that, yes, it is driving, monopolies are driving racial wealth inequality. And yes, monopolies are a product of an oppressive economy that is, you know, where racism is baked into the design of the economy. But they’re also a profit tier, they are gaining profit from the existence of that oppression economy. So, it is in their interest to sustain it and maintain it and to keep it going. And an example that we draw out in the paper that I think is so important and I think really illustrates this is, as we mentioned, one of the pillars that holds up the oppression economy is the criminalization of people of color. That people of color as criminals, or defined as criminals, and mass incarceration, the over-policing of Black and brown communities is something that upholds this oppression economy. And then when you have a company like Amazon who purchases the Ring Corporation —

And for those that may not be familiar, Ring is a product that’s provided by Amazon in which they provide surveillance and home security to everyone. You can get a little Ring doorbell where someone rings the door. You could be at work, you can open it. It’s like, “Oh, cool. Leave my package there.” That’s how they market it. But what that does is that that Ring device pulls in a lot of data. And what we have is cameras in homes all across the country that can be used to surveil people. And what we know is one of the things that police do is they over-surveil Black and brown communities, which leads to the type of mass incarceration that we’ve seen in this country. Well, Amazon has contracts, in fact, 770 contracts with police departments so that they can get the data from those Ring devices. So, I think that really illustrates that not only are monopolies driving racial inequality through the low wages that they pay workers, through the way that they crowd out Back businesses, from the way that they treat immigrants at the workplace, but they’re also actively doing things to prop up and uphold this oppression economy because they are profiting from it.

**VALLAS:** And I really want to encourage folks to read the report, especially activists and advocates who I know we have lots who listen to the show, folks in grassroots-based work who I think are really going to find this report very much geared towards them. That’s another really, I think, significantly unique aspect about what you guys have done here. This isn’t the kind of think tank report that you traditionally read, right? In a lot of ways, you actually really wrote this for, and almost to, grassroots leaders of color as sort of a primer on anti-monopoly activism, but also as something of the beginning of a tool kit that really could help people start to take this on as part and parcel of their work. I’d love to get a little bit into kind of why you structured the report this way, why you took this somewhat different approach in writing, not just for the media and for policymakers and for the Washington elites, but actually for grassroots leaders of color on the ground.

I’m going to quote you again. You write, “This paper aims to contribute a major step in the long journey of bridging the divide between anti-monopoly researchers and policy advocates and grassroots leaders of color.” And you write, “The first step on that journey is knowledge.” What does the current anti-monopoly fight look like? And why do you believe, and Solana as well, why did you guys prioritize bridging this divide?

**GREER:** Yeah, so, as I mentioned in my opening about Liberation in a Generation, we believe that the leaders that are going to lead us into having a **liberation economy** and dismantling this oppression economy that we’ve been talking about are grassroots leaders of color who are building power in communities. And the reason why we believe that is one, they are closest to the people who are experiencing the pain and harm of systemic racism. They are in there with them, they understand, they hear their stories, and they’re organizing them for change. The other thing that we believe is so important is that they are in the business of **building** the power, the **political power**, of those people. They’re not there to serve them, which there’s people that do that. And there’s a reason for that, and it’s important. But they see their role in helping those people build power so that they can have **the agency** to **force their government**, whether it’s a **local**, **state** or **federal**, to **act on their behalf**.

And we believe that if one of the **government’s roles** is to **curb corporate monopoly power**, **they should be the ones driving that change**. Because they will **come with experiences**, which we try to reflect in the report, of **how monopoly power is impacting communities**. You know, how a Amazon distribution center in the Inland Empire in California is impacting not just the economic life, but the quality of life of people in those communities. They could speak to that in real terms. And that not only does the advocacy need to be informed by that, but also the policy making needs to be informed by that.

So, what we did was, with that kind of assumption, we went to groups like the Athena Coalition, who is organizing people against Amazon across the country. We went to Color of Change, who’s an organization that is focusing on curbing the power of big tech: Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple. We went to ACRE: Action Center for Race and the Economy. And they’re doing a lot of work focusing on big banks and the corporate and monopoly power of big banks. And we said, you know, what is holding the kind of grassroots movement back from really diving in, into this anti-monopoly issue? And they came up with, there was a lot of reasons, a lot of varies they identified, and some of them that we’re working with them to solve.

But one of them was, you know, we don’t have kind of a global understanding of how monopoly power impacts people of color in particular. We understand it through the lens of a particular firm, Amazon, Bank of America, like that. But we don’t really have a good grounding in how it happens globally. Therefore, our policymaking doesn’t have kind of an eye towards how could we globally and kind of more broadly address this problem in a way that impacts people across the economy? So, that’s what we hope that this paper would do: would provide that kind of grounding for grassroots leaders so that they can begin to build the type of strategies that kind of have that massive economy-wide impact for people of color.

**VALLAS:** And it might be eye-opening for grassroots leaders who are learning about this issue, who are exploring whether this is something that they can get involved with. But it’s also potentially eye-opening for people who already think they know the antitrust movement or the anti-monopoly movement, given that it is incredibly rare, as you point out, for conversations about the economy to really discuss human impacts. They’re often extremely technocratic conversations, right, that have lots of facts and figures and jargon. But something that you really make a point of doing in this report, which I can’t say I’ve ever seen in a report on monopoly power or anti-trust, is you really walk through the human impacts on people of color as workers, as consumers, as residents in local communities, as small business owners and entrepreneurs, and also as subjects of surveillance, similar to the Amazon Ring concerns that you were raising before. Share some of the examples in the report of those kinds of human impacts on people of color who can obviously be more than just one of those things in that list of categories.

**GREER:** Yeah, I’ll share a couple. There’s one that really, I mean, really broke my heart when I first read about it was Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother — and this is something that’s in the media. So, it’s not as if I’m violating any confidentiality here — but Alec Raeshawn Smith, whose mother, he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan. And this is a story we heard a lot during the ACA kind of debate and the debate around universal healthcare. But he aged off of his mother’s insurance plan, and he made this diff-, had to make this difficult choice about whether he continued to allow his mother to bear the burden of his insulin medication that he needed to regulate his diabetes, or whether he would try to do it kind of on his own. And he determined, he decided to do it on his own. And it’s a hard decision that people have to make every single day, but the cost of that insulin was so high that he was rationing it, that he wasn’t taking what the doctor prescribed. And he passed, and he died from his diabetes.

And this is the type of story that we see all too often. You know, his insulin costs were $1,300 a month without insurance. And we see that a corporation that can control pricing of pharmaceuticals for a lifesaving drug like insulin is how this plays out in real life. And we can get into a law, you know, you can get into a law classroom or into a debate on Congress, and you can start to forget about the real lives that are impacted by these policies. And the reason why we wanted to talk about these stories is because that is what organizers are dealing with every day: They’re working with people that are on insulin, you know. They are working with people who are working at a Amazon fulfillment center. They’re working with people who can’t get a bank account because Bank of America has all these fees on their credit cards and their checking accounts and things like that. So, bringing these stories out is what is going, and this real **human impact**, is what **is going to mobilize**, we believe, **the type of effort that’s needed** to fight back against monopoly power.

**VALLAS:** And I think we’ve got time for a few more examples, because it just, it isn’t the part of the conversation that usually gets any airtime. And it’s part of why I wanted to have you on the show is really to put a human face on some of the impacts. Share a few more examples that really, that popped for you as you were pulling this report together.

**GREER:** Sure. I’d love to talk about John Ingram, who is a Black farmer in Jackson, Mississippi, and he’s a chicken farmer. He grows chickens, and he sells his chickens to Koch Foods, K-o-c-h Foods. And they are the fifth largest poultry company in the country that provides food to places all across the country. But the model which they work with John is very much in the model of the sharecropping model from post-Civil War and on into the Jim Crow era. You know, they determine the way in which John must run his farm, like to how much he feeds his chickens, to the types of facilities he keeps his chickens in, all the way to the price that they will pay to buy his chickens. And what this does is create incredible power over Black farmers like John. And what you have is — And this is pretty much allowed to take place by the USDA.

He had complained, and Black farmers, many Black farmers complained to the Obama-era USDA. And because of the power of those poultry monopolies — you know, I mentioned one in the beginning, Tysons and Koch is another — they really didn’t do anything. And what we see across the country are Black farmers being forced out of business because of the power that these monopolies have.

Another example that I think is really good is also in Mississippi. There’s a Nissan plant that was built in Canton, Mississippi. They relocated there. And they had gotten there because they had gotten a lot of tax breaks from the local government, from the state of Mississippi. And they did so with the promise of good jobs. They talked about jobs would be between $26 and $26 an hour. Well, the type of jobs that they provided were called perma-temp jobs. And these are basically permanent temporary jobs, which I can’t really wrap my mind around what that is, because those are conflicting. Like, what is something that’s permanent and temporary? But they created these jobs that were permanent and temporary, which basically meant that they could at will fire people from their jobs.

So, these aren’t real sound jobs. The wages were low. They did not get great benefits. So, a lot of the promise that was offered was not delivered upon. And that these were primarily the jobs that were provided in this part of Mississippi, despite the millions in tax breaks that Nissan got from, again, the state of Mississippi and the local government there.

**VALLAS:** And there’s so many more examples throughout the report. We’ve got a link and show notes so folks can go in and can sort of page through. It’s written in an incredibly accessible way, right? So, I want to just make that point. You intentionally set this up so that you don’t have to be a lawyer to read this. You don’t have to be a deep antitrust expert to be able to read this. This is actually really for people who might be a little bit newer to the issue.

And one of the big kind of frames of the report as well is you spend a lot of time discussing how, you know, hey, we know folks are busy. We know folks are **fighting a lot of fights right now** and probably **don’t feel like they’ve got** one more to take on, **space for one more to take on**. **But** you really make the point that for folks who are working on, say, advancing the Green New Deal or the Homes Guarantee or other policies within the social and the economic and the racial justice advocacy sphere, you really make the point that **challenging monopoly power is actually a prerequisite to succeeding in those other fights**. What’s your message to advocates and to activists and policy folks, anyone who’s listening or who might read the report, what’s your message to them about why they should see the anti-monopoly fight as their own, even if they feel like that’s not the space that they work in?

**GREER:** Yeah, I mentioned Action Center for Race and the Economy. Mo BP-Weeks, who is a co-director there, often says, You just have to follow the money.” And I think organizers know that when you follow the money, you usually find exactly the targets that you need. And there’s a section in the report called Monopoly Power Is Corporate Power Magnified and Maximized. And we believe, and I think that we’re right, that if you focus in on and treat these monopolies like corporate entities, you can begin to see change in a lot of the transformative movements that people are having, for example, the Green New Deal and efforts to create a more equitable and healthy environment and to curb climate change. You know, the targets are Big Oil and Big Energy. And those institutions, while they’re large, still operate like corporations. They have a CEO, they have Board of Directors, they have shareholders. And all of those people have some stake in the company and have some culpability to the issues that you are trying to solve. So, it becomes another tool in the toolbox.

We believe that anti-monopoly advocacy is just another tool in the toolbox that could be used to curb corporate power so that you can **begin to get wins on other issues** that you may be focusing on, whether it is the **environment**, whether it is affordable housing, whether it’s creating higher wages for workers, whether it is to create a safer community free of **police violence**. We think that by focusing on curbing the monopoly power of the corporations that are causing that pain is just another tool that can be used in the advocacy for those broader kind of movement priorities that we hear a lot about.

**VALLAS:** Now, one of the things that you and I have talked about a good amount before, and something that we actually get into a lot on this podcast, is the narratives that are out there that we’re often sort of fighting against that might be invisible, but that shape people’s views about, say, the economy and economic policy, even if they’re not aware that that’s the sort of lens that they’re looking through or the pair of glasses that they’re looking through. It’s also something that you really spend a lot of time working on. And it’s very, it’s central, really, to a lot of what Liberation in a Generation is advancing, is narrative change, right? Especially dismantling, for example, the neoliberal narratives that are really at the root of so many of the social injustices that folks who listen to the show are out there fighting every day.

You talk about government, in the case of the anti-monopoly fight, as a villain and as complicit with corporations in allowing unchecked corporate power to do the damage that you’ve been talking about, that we’ve been discussing up to this point. But you actually talk about them in the context of the anti-monopoly fight government as the villain who could turn into the hero. Talk about why you think it’s so important to construct a narrative with a villain, with a hero. And we’ll get back now into kind of the policy conversation of this, why government has the potential to turn from being a villain to being a hero in this context.

**GREER:** Yeah, I mean, it’s really, when you ~~look at~~ (consider) the **history** of **anti-monopoly advocacy**, you see that **there once was a time where the government was an active participant in curbing corporate power** and was doing so on behalf of workers. You know, you see there were passages of transformative legislation like the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act or the Federal Trade and Commissions Act. And these were all passed in the early 20th century. And they were meant to curb this kind of corporate monopoly power in, you know, back in the Gilded Age when we saw the trust corporations, the railroads, the Carnegie steel industry. And there was this active role of government doing this.

But what we’ve seen since then is, as corporate power grew, begin to influence government more, a real devolution of that activist role the government played. And what we began to see really, you know, and probably the heyday of this for the monopolies began in the 1980s and continues on today, was actual collusion between the government and these monopolies. And that what we saw, what we see today is there have been, there were more mergers and acquisitions under Obama administration than any other administration before it. So, we’re at the point now where the government is really seen as a, it’s really a collaborator in building monopoly power.

What we need to get back to is a place where the government is playing its role in making sure that not just the, it’s not just about the size of the company, but that the company’s power is not getting to the point where they’re bringing down the standard of living for workers, particularly Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and Asian-American workers. That consumers are seeing the type of prices so that they can afford the things that they need to live a daily life. That small businesses, particularly Black businesses, are not being crowded out. And that that is a role for government. So, **government can be the hero**, and it **should be the hero** because **it is our government**, you know.

We are a democracy. We should have say, each and every one of us, in what our government does, and our government should be working on our behalf, not on behalf of Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, or Elon Musk. **We should be expecting the government to play that active role**, and **not just** recognizing that it should be done **for all workers**, but ensuring that workers of color in particular and people of color, households of color **in particular**, are being protected against the tyranny of monopoly power.

**VALLAS:** And one of the later chapters in the report really offers kind of a primer in some of that early 20th century history that you were just summarizing around the time when government in the U.S. actually did take action to rein in monopoly power. You mentioned the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, all of that, I would encourage folks to go in and read. And there’s probably a lot that folks don’t know about that era following the gilded era, that really was the time when the federal government in the U.S. did actually take action to check corporate power. Who are the key players with power in the federal government to do something about this? And what are some of the existing solutions that are being advanced?

**GREER:** Yeah. So, today, I mean, it’s your Congress, of course, has a lot of power. Because there’s an, I believe, there’s a need for new kind of legislation that new powers be created, new constructions of how we regulate monopoly that only Congress could do by passing laws. But under our current laws, the Federal Trade Commission is responsible for responding and kind of being the first, the cop on the beat to make sure that companies aren’t violating any of our current antitrust laws. They can issue criminal and civil penalties, and they are the ones who are in charge of enforcing those kind of monumental legislation that we’ve talked about.

The Justice Department also has a important role in moving legislation forward. In fact, they are the entity that when you hear about breaking up corporations, the Justice Department is the one that usually does that. And they’ve done it in the past. You know, they did it. They broke up the big railroad monopolies of the past, and they broke up AT&T in the 1970s into what they call the Baby Bells. And they currently have a lawsuit today against Google to look at Google’s monopoly power. And in the lawsuit, there’s a call for breaking it up into smaller pieces. So, there’s that.

And then there’s other agencies, you know. As it relates to banking, it’s the Department of Treasury with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency, the CFPB in banking. In agriculture, it’s the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In energy, it’s the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. Each of these industries kind of have their own government entity that is responsible for regulating the work that they do. And they play a role in curbing corporate power. And one other one that I’d mention is states. State Attorney Generals also have a lot of power to curb corporate power, because one thing that’s little known is that states are the ones that incorporate corporations. And so, they have a lot of ability and a lot of power to regulate agencies.

As far as solutions go, there’s a lot of solutions that are kind of out there. And what this report does not do is propose to put forth a particular solution that would work for people of color, because we actually think that that’s the work that grassroots leaders of color should embark on in the future, is **designing and developing** those **particular solutions**. But some of the solutions that we have in our toolbox today are, for example, breaking up large corporations. That is something that we can do today. We can also regulate, tightly regulate corporations using the existing tools in the toolbox. The CFPB and what it’s done in the banking industry is a good example of that.

But one idea that’s been batted around, and I think Elizabeth Warren proposes for big tech in particular, is new enforcement agencies that are more in line with the realities that we see in the economy today and the way in which monopolies form. A lot of our laws are meant, were developed to regulate railroad and steel monopolies, and those aren’t the monopolies that we’re seeing today. So, there is a group of folks out there talking and saying that there’s a real need to think about new agencies with **new authorities that could regulate monopoly power**.

**VALLAS:** And of course, it’s **not** exactly **a pie-in-the-sky idea** to think about creating those new agencies. Elizabeth Warren, who you mentioned, right, was the godmother of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CFPB, which is pretty young as far as federal agencies go. It was created during the Obama years. Although that may feel like a different lifetime at this point in a lot of ways.

We’re going to run out of time. But the last couple of minutes that we have, I’d really love to spend delving into the recommendation that really is, in a lot of ways, the kind of central call of this report. A lot of it is really addressed to grassroots leaders, and for the reasons you’ve discussed, right, about bridging that divide. But it’s also addressed to the existing anti-monopoly tent: the folks who are already working within research and advocacy spaces on these issues. And you say very pointedly, “The anti-monopoly movement, within **research and advocacy spaces** especially, should embolden grassroots leaders of color to deliver anti-racist policy solutions aimed specifically to curtail monopoly power.” So, there you’re describing that agenda that you think grassroots leaders really should be centered in developing. But you continue. You actually, you sort of raise the ante with this call. You also say, “It’s **not enough** to ~~speak~~ **(argue) virtuously** about racial equity and economic justice. We **have to intentionally center people of color** in the development of **policy change**.”

And you call explicitly for a reimagination of this movement through a racial justice lens that broadens the tent and **intentionally makes this work more accessible** and **more human-impact focused** so that it’s not just about bringing folks in and centering the work differently. It’s actually about doing the work differently, entirely, so that it’s **not just that technocratic** and sort of small-tent D.C. **elite approach** to **changing these policies**. Talk a little bit about what that actually would look like. You have some pretty specific ideas that, I agree with you, would actually **transform the anti-monopoly movement** in ways that would **reimagine it** and approach the work differently. Get concrete. What would that actually look like?

**GREER:** Yeah, and thank you for this question, Rebecca. You know, I mentioned that history. And I think what we know about public policy and the **history** of public **policy** in the United States, whether it was this antitrust movement in response to the Gilded Age, whether it was the New Deal, is that when it’s done in a **race-neutral** way, it doesn’t just leave people of color behind — Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian Americans — it also **harms people of color**. And what we need to do is, of course, what we **can learn from that history** is that we should **not repeat it**. And we should not repeat it, **by centering people of color as the core beneficiaries** of the **policy**. Because we believe **if that is done**, not only will they be served, but we will all then be served because we’re **ensuring** that we’re **not leaving anyone behind**, and we’re not intentionally harming anyone. And we think that that’s so critically important in this kind of **new era of antitrust policy that could come forth**.

# 1NR

## Mechanics

### Alt---2NC---2

#### The alt is a crucial framing device---they have little on its application as way for us to endorse most of their strategy and isolate only moments of disagreement. Evaluate it as a PIK out of some of their frames---meaning their ONLY approach is to defend what they did in moments we critiqued. They’ve conceded we get to conditionally narrow frames through out the debate---somemthing that we explicitly said in the 1NC---NO new answers.

#### Our interp generates better praxis. Requiring us to negate the entire 1AC forces us to critique elements of their strategy that *are* correct, such as harm area identification which makes each debate worse at testing the parts of their strategy that need improvement, OR it rigs the game for the aff, disincentivizing neg engagement, because disproving the entire 1AC is impossible when they make strategic choices about which threads to extend.

#### Praxis outweighs. Every strategy has benefits and downsides; but the worst strategy of all would be to make the curricular choice to not consider those nuances because affs say oppression is bad---that’s a truth statement which requires refinement. This applies to their aff as proven by the existence of our net benefits---they should be debated because the aff may not be the best option. We read evidence to quantify this impact in the 1NC, and they dropped it---that’s Williams.

### Perm---2NC

#### Permutation links or severs---the alt is aff-minus: including frames we critiqued links, not including them severs and is a voting issue because it incentivizes ambiguity and destroys any specific engagement.

#### They shouldn’t even get a perm because the debate is about testing methods.

#### If they win this, kick the alt---we still win on the case turn.

### PIKs Bad---2NC

#### ‘PIKs bad’ was beaten in the 1NC:

#### 1---PRAXIS---critique of frames is necessary---every left-movement is differentially effective; making the choice to not consider details of strategy denies knowledge about strategy effectiveness and artificially insulates them from criticism, which turns the case---that’s Williams

#### 2---NUANCE---they force unhelpful extremes like impact turns that miss key points of clash and create an impossible neg burden when they can leverage many good themes against the few portions that we can turn---that’s anti-educational and unfair

#### 3---IT’S FAIR---they chose the 1AC, they should defend it. There’s literature defending everything and unconstrained pre-round choice raises the bar. Letting them off the hook creates shallow advocacy and argumentative irresponsibility

#### Err Neg---these were developed in the 1NC and they didn’t answer them specifically.

#### Not a voting issue---reject the argument, but vote neg on the case turn.

### A2: Frames is Abstraction/Our aff is offense

#### It presumes a regressive understanding of discourse as static and intentioned that’s been disproven by waves of theoretical advancement in rhetorical studies--- denies the excitability of speech, which is critical to progressive re-appropriation to challenge systems of oppression

Young 11 – Dr. Kelly Michael Young, Professor of Communication at Wayne State University, PhD in Communication Studies from Wayne State University, MA in Communication Studies from Ball State University, BS in Secondary Education from Ball State University, “IMPOSSIBLE CONVICTIONS: CONVICTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE AND SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE”, Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, p. 6-19

Despite the fact that the theorists who provide the strongest defense for the performative power of discourse draw from Austin (1975) and Derrida (1988), very few debaters read evidence or base their arguments within the performative frameworks articulated by these theorists. As a result, much of academic debate’s engagement with the exciting possibilities offered by this literature is lost as the students selectively adopt in self-serving fashion from this work. Examples of these self-serving practices include the debaters who present a hodge-podge of arguments from various critical theorists to generate offensive responses to opponents’ arguments with no understanding of the implications and contractions created at the intersections of those theorists’ ideas. Or, they realize that there are contradictions but know that it would take the other side too long to explain them and so these problems are simply glossed over. Worse, many of the debate practices adopted to defend elements of performance debate may run contrary to this literature base. For example, opponents of performative arguments will often run quasi-counterplans that select and advocate parts of the 1AC performance or permute part of the negative’s performative framework. In response, teams will contend that their opponents cannot “just snatch [the performance] and add it [to their speech]….Kritik is a verb, and not a noun, which means you have to do it in order for it to be done” (Evans, 2011a, para. 15). Similarly, teams will contend that their opponents’ attempt to capture part of their performance is inauthentic and insincere because they did not initiate the performance (Zompetti, 2004). However, given Butler’s (1997) and Derrida’s (1988) perspectives on the performative, which will be discussed at length later in this essay, these claims to an authentic and sincere performance are perhaps problematic. Before we turn to that discussion, I want to explore a second recent development that relates to sincerity and convictions: the contemporary debate about the ethics and effect of switch-sides debate (SSD).

The Debate about SSD

1950-1960s: SSD as Unethical Indoctrination

Speech communication journals have hosted a number of debates about the ethical implications of the debate tournament practice of having students debate both sides of a given proposition. With the rise of tournamentstyle debate competitions in the 1930s, debate educators became highly concerned about the ethical and pedagogical value of having students debate against their convictions by having to switch sides on a topic each round. In 1954, the selection of the national college debate topic, Resolved: that the United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the communist government of China, generated a great deal of controversy (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief, & Woods., 2007). At the height of the Cold War and McCarthyism, a number of schools such as the military academies refused to affirm the topic in fear that affirmation would “indoctrinate America’s youth, while giving aid and comfort to the enemy” (English et al., 2007, p. 222).

Within this context, Murphy (1957) outlines the fundamental objection to SSD in arguing, “debate…is a form of public speaking. A public statement is a public commitment. Before one takes the platform, [he/she] should study the question, [he/she] should discuss it until [he/she] knows where [he/she] stands. Then [he/ she] should take that stand” (p. 2). In his review of public speaking ethics literature, Murphy (1957) contends that when students argue against their convictions, they are both immoral and “public liar[s]” (p. 2). To avoid this, Murphy (1957) argues that students should debate only from their sincere beliefs.

In their response to Murphy (1957), both Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958) maintain that tournament-style debating is a unique form of analytic speaking that is different than persuasive debate about political conviction. As such, both scholars suggest that there is great pedagogical value to viewing controversies from both sides within an educational setting. Additionally, Dell (1958) contends that because all ethics are contextual, SSD should be seen as an ethical practice. Of the many arguments raised and debated, the two most frequently discussed were: (1) that debate tournaments are or are not public speaking situations; and (2) that SSD does or does not teach essential logical skills necessary to avoid dogmatism (Cripe, 1957; Galloway, 2007; Murphy, 1957). Put differently, Cripe (1957) explains, “the whole problem seems to be one of definition, of defining what ‘debate’ is, and what ‘ethical’ means” (p. 209).

Central to these broader ethics arguments is the status of students’ convictions. For instance, according to Murphy (1957), students are most likely to have welldeveloped convictions prior to engaging in debate and SSD only creates confusion for students in what they sincerely believe. In response, Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958) maintain that debaters can separate their true feelings while making the best possible case for a different side for the purposes of competition. In addition, they refute Murphy’s argument that students have firm convictions on a number of complicated topics prior to debating. As they conclude, students’ true beliefs are likely underdeveloped and can be best clarified and strengthened by SSD. Additionally, according to Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958), SSD helps develop good future citizens because it best guards against the development of rigid ideological views. Summarizing the debate aptly, Greene and Hicks (2005) conclude, “at the heart of the ‘debate about debate’…was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral economy of liberal citizenship” (p. 100).

In their later review of the controversy, Klopf and McCroskey (1964) maintain that the debate over the ethics of SSD is over. As they explain,

The relative ethic has been accepted by a large majority of those involved directly with academic debate. Both by their opinions and their actions they believe switch-sides debating is ethical. So do we. The controversy over the ethics of debating both sides is [finished]! (para. 25-26)

While the majority of coaches and directors may have declared SSD ethical, the status and importance of student convictions remained up for debate, as we see in another debate 40 years later.

2000s: SSD as Cultural Technology of Imperialism

Greene and Hicks (2005) revisited the 1950-1960s debate to interrogate the cultural effect that results from the promotion of SSD debate as a corrective for intransigence. Rather than assess the ethical implications of SSD on students, Greene and Hicks (2005) examine: The articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a “technology” of liberal participatory democracy….tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. (English et al., 2007, p. 223-224) In advancing this argument, Greene and Hicks (2005) contend that SSD creates a gap between a student’s “embodied speech act and his/her speech convictions” that allows for the privileging of a method of conflict resolution that is based on reason rather than beliefs or authority (p. 120). As they conclude, the controversy “pre-figures how a deliberative theory of democracy requires a moral theory of the subject to prepare that subject for the transformational potential associated with the ‘gentle force of the better argument’” (Greene & Hicks, 2005, p. 120). Greene and Hicks’ implied alternative to SSD returns to the earlier form of debate that “privileges personal conviction” as the governing element of debate (Stannard, 2006, para. 32). In doing so, they suggest that academic debate should close the gap between the speech act of debate and the individual’s first order convictions.

Following Greene and Hicks’ (2005) lead, Massey (2006a) calls on academic debate coaches to reform SSD in order to allow students debating on the affirmative of a topic the space to express their true beliefs. Somewhat mirroring Murphy’s (1957) concerns, Massey (2006a) maintains that “we should not separate speech from conviction…discourse creates reality, and we must examine the effects that verbalizing things [students] might disagree with could have on the [audience]” (para. 17). In a different argument, Massey (2006a) is concerned that students are harmed by SSD because recent debate resolutions always require the affirmative to defend action by the United States federal government and state action. As he further explains, affirmative debaters must always debate from an “exceptionalists view” without ever interrogating the federal government’s role in causing a host of problems (Massey, 2006a, para. 11). Consequently, Massey (2006a) contends that SSD

…forces a one way ideological conformity, rather than a give and take reflection that most proponents of switch side debate want to presume. My position is debate can be a training ground for discussing those issues that are important to debaters, and giving students agency for dealing with your own personal oppressions and inequalities. (para. 11)

To best capture the benefits of SSD, Massey (2006b) claims that students on the negative are required to refute whatever the affirmative team presents, which gains “all the benefits of switch side debate” (para. 2). Ultimately, Massey’s criticism has less to do with Greene and Hicks’s (2005) concern with the cultural effect of promoting a certain model of liberal citizenship and more with the potential exceptionalist effect that having to defend the United States federal government has on students. However, like Greene and Hicks, Massey privileges the verbal expression of conviction as what should regulate student advocacy.

In response to Greene and Hicks (and as an effect, responding to Massey as well), English et al. (2007) defend SSD in arguing that “rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (p. 224). Similarly, Stannard (2006) contends that conviction-driven debate would produce “simultaneous zones of speech activism” that cause students to be:

…so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resource and true believers in the service of continued material domination. (para. 35)

Thus, for English et al. (2007) and Stannard (2006), SSD is a technology that prevents the very moral and cultural problems that concern Greene and Hicks (2005) and Massey (2006a).

In an additional defense, Galloway (2007) outlines a dialogic model of competitive debate that “preserves the affirmative team’s obligation to uphold the debate resolution” while, at the same time, allowing the speech act of the debater to take a number of forms (e.g., critical, performative, policy) (p. 2). Once offered, the affirmative speech act awaits response from the negative. The promise of the model, according to Galloway (2007), is that it preserves the stable predictability of a resolution while allowing debaters to engage these propositions in a number of ways. In making this argument, Galloway (2007) responds to advocates of conviction-driven debate in contending that SSD does not cause students to lose their beliefs. Instead, “conviction is not a priori to discussion, it flows from it” through the testing of ideas and beliefs (p. 11).

Ultimately, both debates about SSD are founded on the idea that student convictions are important. However, what is disputed is the impact that communication has on these convictions. For instance, for the opponents of SSD, conviction exists prior to public debate and is grounded in the sincere intentions of the speaker (Murphy, 1957). Yet, these beliefs are fragile, as they are always at risk of being corrupted and lost in public argument. For the supporters of SSD, conviction is something discovered, tested, and sustained through public speech acts. While both of these positions bank a great deal on the importance and role of student convictions in speech acts, there is no discussion in these debates about how students construct or convey these beliefs through communication and performance. Given that academic debate remains a communication activity, how we convey our sincere beliefs and what effect those speech acts have are rather important issues to explore. In that vein, the next section of this essay explores the speech act theories of Austin, Butler, and Derrida and their implications for these debates about sincere beliefs and performance.

Speech Act, Performance Theory, and Convictions

As my review of both performance debate theory and the reoccurring debate over SSD suggests, a number of questions about the expression of convictions remain unanswered. For instance, how do we recognize that students are debating from their true beliefs? What effect do these convictions have on debates? What are the effects of using convictions as the governing principle to evaluate speech acts or promote competitive debate? Before answers to these questions can be discerned, I now turn to speech act theory, as it may provide a number of insights into the underlying concerns about student convictions in competitive debate.

Austin’s Speech Act Theory

For many years in linguistic and rhetorical study, the prevailing explanation of the operation of linguistics was that the conscious speaker and his/her sincere intentions controlled the meaning of communication within a rhetorical situation (Culler, 1981). Argumentation and communication scholarship also often presumed that the “primary purpose of language was to be descriptive or make true or false (constantive) statements about the world” (Alfino, 1991, p. 144). However, Austin (1975) maintains that several statements do not fit within the constantive category. Rather, many utterances “actually perform the action to which they refer (e.g., ‘I promise to pay you tomorrow’)” (Culler, 1981, p. 16). In his work, Austin (1975) argues that these performative statements, rather than being a special case, constitute a majority of statements while the constantive is a special case of the performative.

Austin (1975) also identifies two levels of effect for any speech act to further clarify the nature and use of performative utterances. The first is the perlocutionary effect, which is the psychological consequences of the speech act, which include motivating and persuading an immediate audience. In swaying or moving the audience, the speech act may convince someone to change his/her feelings or thoughts or even take action. But these changes may be indirect as they affect an intermediary person and occur over time as a result of the original speech act (Butler, 1997). The second level is illocutionary force, which is the performative effects of declaring, identifying, promising, and requesting. As Austin (1975) explains, illocutionary force is the “performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something” (pp. 99-100). Illocutionary force is a direct consequence of a speech act; however, the force of the speech act is not located within “merely a single moment” and cannot succeed with just a simple utterance (Butler, 1997, p. 3). Rather, illocutionary effects rely on a number of prior conventions and rituals. For example, as Austin (1975) suggests, successful illocutionary acts depend on a number of conditions:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) the particular person and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely. (pp. 14-15)

In outlining these various conditions for effective performances, Austin seeks to demonstrate that the conditions and conventions of a given context are what control the illocutionary effect of discourse. In doing so, he privileges convention and context over the consciousness and intentions of speakers as the source of performative effect.

While elevating the importance of context over speaker’s intentions, Austin (1975) also awkwardly seeks to exclude non-serious, or what he calls “parasitic,” speech acts (p. 22). For instance, he considers performances by an actor or statements made in jest as intelligible yet parasitic uses of language. Yet, in excluding these fake or infelicitous speech acts, Austin (1975) inadvertently privileges the conscious speaker and his/her sincere intentions as the center of his speech act system—the very thing he sought to avoid (Bérubé, 2004).

Derrida and Butler’s Speech Act Theory

In highlighting the shortcoming of Austin’s (1975) desire to preserve conscious intentions and sincerity, Derrida (1988) asks: can communication have an inherent, intended and sincere meaning? In responding to his own question, Derrida (1988) maintains that sincere intentions cannot control a speech act because it is constantly repeatable—iterable—as it is cited and recited by different speakers in different contexts. While the speaker might have a genuine purpose in making a statement, as the statement is used and repeated by other speakers in different contexts, the meaning and the force of the statement changes. For example, if debate students use this article as evidence in a debate brief, I cannot control how they use material from this essay in their arguments. As more and more students cite the argument, we all become multiple “authors” of the speech act. Likewise, my citation of various scholars within this essay creates an assemblage of ideas that have very different meaning and force once combined into this article. Thus, while many people helped create this document, the absence of their intent and presence allows me to deploy their ideas and thoughts in different ways.

Influenced by de Saussure’s (1972) notions of linguistic structuralism, absence and presence, and diachronic studies of meaning and Barthes’s (1977) work on the “death of the author,” Derrida contends, that the “structure of absence” in all uses of language allows all utterances to be endlessly cited and iterated (Alfino, 1991, p. 146). This inherent possibility of continuous citation and repetition, according to Derrida, is the very condition in which discourse remains meaningful and has effect, even if the meaning is different in each new context (Alfino, 1991). Within Derrida’s (1988) system of speech acts, authorial intent does not disappear, but instead must be understood as an effect that “no longer [is] able to govern the entire scene and the system of utterance” (p. 20). Additionally, the privileging of the author’s sincere intentions and beliefs in an appropriate context for a performance should be understood as an attempt to restrict the infinite meanings of the performance (Stocker, 2006). In addition, Derrida (1988) contends that sincere intentions and beliefs cannot control systems of meaning because we cannot read the speaker’s mind, our communication always expresses more than we anticipate, and intention and belief is never fully present to the speaker due to the unconscious. Consequently, what matters most in a speech act is how context makes possible the structure, conventions, and meaning of communication.

In making these arguments, Derrida (1988) maintains what Austin wants to exclude—the non-serious and infelicitous performance. In doing so, Derrida argues that the possibility of non-serious or fake performances and reiterations of performances demonstrate that intentionality and sincerity do not regulate the absolute meaning of a speech act. Instead, the system is never fully closed. Rather, it is porous and constantly open to change due to the context and conventions within and outside the immediate context in which the performance occurs (Derrida, 1988).

In her ruminations about the nature of injurious speech and the problems associated with censorship, Butler (1997) builds on Austin’s and Derrida’s works to argue that a structural gap between intention and sincerity and an utterance is necessary in order for language to have agency. Like Derrida, Butler (1997) contends that language and speech acts are always plagued with excess. As she further explains, the speech act is “always to some extent unknowing about what it performs, that it always says something that it does not intend” (Butler, 1997, p. 10). Even in the situation where a predetermined topic is up for discussion – like a resolution for debate – Butler (1997) would contend that meaning remains unsettled because the words in the topic and the arguments made for either side of the topic do not have stable meaning. For instance, thousands of debates each year occur under a shared national debate resolution, yet each debate is significantly different than the other, even when they deal with similar sub-sets of the resolution. The very fact that there is no consensus on what a debate resolution precisely means at the end of a debate season and debates are performed so differently under one topic throughout a season demonstrates the play and excess of speech acts. This structural inability to master or control our performances and speech acts for Butler (1997) does not mark the failure of communication; instead, it serves as its radical potential. For example, without a gap between intention and beliefs and utterance, discourse is unrecoverable and fixed. However, if a gap does exist, contested and once harmful words like “queer” can be re-appropriated and given new meaning within different contexts by different speakers. This does not mean that the discourse is acceptable uncritically; rather, the new use of the terms demonstrate the exclusive nature of the rhetoric and produces a democratic contestation over formerly racist or misogynist discourse that extend the range of the term. For instance, the activist group Queer Nation re-appropriates the term “queer” in order to contest the exclusive nature of labels such as “gay,” “lesbian,” or “homosexual.” In doing so, the group seeks to highlight the homophobic fear of what is “queer” by turning the term against itself, as the group’s motto, “We’re here. We’re Queer. Get used to it!” signifies (Brontsema, 2012). Another example of re-appropriation can be seen as a result of the recent decision by Arizona’s Tucson Unified School District to ban certain books from the district’s Mexican-American Studies program. The action caused several activists to form the Librotraficante Caravan, an underground and traveling library featuring the work of writers who were banned by the district. The group’s name – book trafficker – and tactics reclaim a number of negative stereotypes surrounding immigration, like the underground smuggling/trafficking of goods (Steiner, 2012). Through this re-appropriation over time, these terms lose their harmful effect and can be used in new and powerful ways through iteration (Butler, 1993, 1997).

Due to this break between belief, intent, and rhetoric, the force and power of discourse cannot be located in a single speech act. As Butler (1997) explains in the context of hate speech, “racist speech works through the invocation of convention; it circulates, and though it requires a subject for its speaking, it neither begins nor ends with the subject who speaks or with the specific name that is used” (p. 34). In other words, the illocutionary force of a speech act comes from the prior conventions and citational history that both precedes and conditions the use of particular discourse. While an individual can be liable for what is said at a perlocutionary level, reprimanding and rejecting the speech act does little to curb the force and power of the discourse at an illocutionary level of uptake. Indeed, such attempts actually lock into place injurious speech, “preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose” (Butler, 1997, p. 38). Instead of preserving this injurious history, efforts to reclaim or re-signify discourse require laying claim to a term or utterance and using it against its “constitutive historicity” (Butler, 1993, p. 227). Yet, to Butler (1993), re-signification or the queering of language through performance is not simply a question of will or conviction. Rather, performance requires both the enactment of the utterance and the transference of binding power onto that utterance. The authority of the act is not determined by an external judge or the intent and convictions of the speaker; instead, it is located in the citational history of the discourse (Butler, 1993).

## Ballot

### 2NC

#### Just because something is good doesn’t mean you have to get involved. The value of the 1AC is self-evident, it doesn’t need external validation by a debate judge to become actualized. Decline to connect their performance to a need for the ballot by voting Negative. There are 2 links in the 1NC:

#### First, SURVEILLANCE---judgement renders their argument an object of analysis within the gaze of the academy, not an expression of protest. Scholarly dissection makes it legible and comprehensible, ripe for surveillance by dominant power relations that defuse critical potential. The win also has this effect: prominence and advancing in the tournament brings scrutiny and analysis. The transformative effect is backwards: exposure doesn’t produce change, the dominant culture co-opts them.

#### Second, CATHEXIS---the quest for legitimacy through ballots is a placebo that deflects from effective change and undermines it by siphoning off political energy in the pursuit of meaningless victories---ask yourself: what value do you add that the 1AC was lacking? If their criticisms of debate are correct, what’s the point of progressing within it? The answer is none, and it dangerously trades-off with other routes that can be effective---that’s Phillips

#### More links:

#### RE-PRESENTATION:

#### Their speech had value in and of itself, not because it was viewed by you, and it is fleeting and exists only in the moment---attempts to later connect to it via the ballot gives too much power to the audience because the speaker is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations---this is a means of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism, which turns the case

Phelan 6 – Peggy Phelan, Chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, “Unmarked: The Politics of Performance”, in Visual Culture: Experiences in Visual Culture, p. 146-149

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance.

The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.

The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawn increasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle, for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen from the museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and members of the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The fact that these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—only lends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art object and the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistant to the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if there production is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memory forget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personal meanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptive recovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. The descriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generates recovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers. The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs always to be remembered.

For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148

I

Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms.

Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3

To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself.

This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence.

In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149

Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animal with whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. The mimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capital and reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing about performance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls in behind the drive of the documentary. Performance’s challenge to writing is to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

#### CRUEL OPTIMISM:

#### Locating political value in the ballot instills an adaptive politics of being and effaces institutional constraints that reproduce structural violence

Brown 95 – Dr. Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D in Political Philosophy from Princeton University, States of Injury, p. 21-23

For some, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other modalities of domination, the language of "resistance" has taken up the ground vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment” that carries the ghost of freedom's valence.

Yet as many have noted, insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes on the one hand, and insofar as its practitioners often seek to void it of normativity to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes on the other, it is at best politically rebellious; at worst, politically amorphous. Resistance stands against, not for; it is re-action to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, and it is neutral with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination.

If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which protest always transpires inside the regime; “empowerment,” in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment too often signal an oddly adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register implicitly located on something of an other worldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power. In this regard, despite its apparent locution of resistance to subjection, contemporary discourses of empowerment partake strongly of liberal solipsism—the radical decontextualization of the subject characteristic of liberal discourse that is key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism. Moreover, in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotional bearing and self-regard, empowerment is a formulation that converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs in masking the power of the regime.

This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while the notion of empowerment articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and eco- nomic democracy, contemporary deployments of that notion also draw so heavily on an undeconstructed subjectivity that they risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life. Indeed, the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so forms an important element of legitimacy for the antidemocratic dimensions of liberalism.

### A2: Neg Wants the Ballot, Too!

#### Our argument isn’t a critique of winning: that’s inevitable, one team must win and one must lose. Rather, it’s an argument about assigning external value to the ballot beyond the win/loss. Only the aff does that; voting neg declines that proposal.

#### Even if there’s tension, vote neg:

#### 1) Negation Theory---debate is about testing the aff, not a comparative choice between teams. If they’re bad, they shouldn’t win, even if we’re worse.

#### 2) Presumption---if the ballot has no value for either team, there’s no reason to vote for them and they haven’t met their burden of proof

## Hartman

### Overview

#### Hartman’s Continuity Thesis relies on the Slave Narratives Collection to prove subjugation’s continuity. Even if the outcome of that Thesis is accurate, the process used to reach it merits criticism.

#### We’ll break this down in greater detail:

Roosevelt realized in the 1930’s that many people that had been subject to de jure legal Southern slavery were dying. Roosevelt made a Public Works project to gather their narratives.

The SNC was flawed from the Left and Right. There were huge polling biases based on non-black data collectors. And, all of it was designed to justify liberal government intervention – the opposite of the Aff thesis.

While there may be some universal experiences amongst those that identify as black – the SNC was the worst way to reach that conclusion. Biases selective parts of narratives all while erasing black perspective and seeking to create a narrative of STANDARDIZED EXPERIENCES.

Obviously has close interactions with their pornotroping argument – its absolutely what the Roosevelt administration was doing with the SNC

Their only answer was the 1NC ev goes aff --

#### Absolutely not

Carmody ‘10

Todd Carmody – Lecturer on History & Literature at Harvard University, where he teaches nineteenth- and twentieth-century African American and American literatures and in the Modern Europe concentration. Previously, I held an ACLS New Faculty Fellowship in English at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Sheila Biddle Ford Foundation Fellowship from Harvard’s W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research – “STERLING BROWN AND THE DIALECT OF NEW DEAL OPTIMISM” – from the Journal – Callaloo 33.3 (2010) – pages 820-840 – available via the online database entitled Black Studies Center.

One might, of course, argue that Brown, facing the institutional racism of the FWP, chooses the lesser of two evils, an artificially standardized lexicon over the possibility that these testimonies might be minstrelized by white program officials. FWP records, however, suggest that Brown's investment in standardization went beyond pragmatism to critique the notions of cultural authenticity that provided the Slave Narrative Collection with its mandate (notions often associated with Brown's own poetry). Brown sought less, in other words, to authorize a particular dialect or to define what Kamau Brathwaite has called "nation language" than to denaturalize the black voice underwriting the FWP's liberal agenda of cultural renewal.5 Such a critique is particularly apparent in Brown's consistent emphasis on the form in which these interviews would reach the public, an emphasis that underscores the processes of mediation that subtend the construction of the "authentic" black voice. Brown envisions the publication of a single book—comprised of a broad selection of interviews with speakers of various regional dialects—written in a single voice. His emphasis, however, is on the reader rather than the speaker.6 (the next paragraph is a direct transcription of Brown’s words, not the author’s. No text has been modified or omitted): I appreciate the fact that many of the writers have recorded sensitively. The writer who wrote "ret" for right is probably as accurate as the one who spelled it "right." But in a single publication, not devoted to a study of local speech, the reader may conceivably be puzzled by different spellings of the same word. The word "wha-folks," "whufolks," "whi'f oiks/' etc. can all be heard in the South. But " whitefolks" is easier for the reader, and the word itself is suggestive of the setting and the attitude, (qtd. in "Correspondence Pertaining to Studies of Former Slaves") Brown frequently defers to the reader in internal memos like this one, recommending that "exact pronunciation [be of] secondary" priority so that the volume of testimonies he envisions will be "more appealing and less difficult for the average reader." Indeed, Brown introduces his list of standardized spellings by declaring: "I believe that there should be, for this book, a uniform word for each of these" (qtd. in "Correspondence Pertaining to Studies of Former Slaves"). Brown's focus on the reader and on the book form in which the testimonies collected by the FWP were to be publicly distributed foregrounds the constructed nature of the testifying speaker. Rather than imply, that is to say, that the experiences of ex-slaves could be made available in any unmediated or "word-for-word" fashion if one could only find the proper notational system or proceed with enough patience and skill, Brown seeks to remind readers that they are in fact reading a textual construction and not listening to the unencumbered first-person testimony of a former slave.

## New – Neoliberal Metaphor

#### Calling violence “monopolization” flattens the nuance of the harmful norms and monopolization. Speech acts grow more potent when such deployments are removed.

Kipnis ‘7 Andrew Kipnis - Senior Fellow and Professor Andrew Kipnis in The Department of Anthropology, The Australian National University – “Neoliberalism reified: suzhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China” - Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 13,383-400 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - obtained via J-Stor database.

Another problem is that neoliberal policies, *however defined*, may be sincerely or disingenously pursued. Often enough, powerful *social actors* ~~mouth~~ (deploy) neoliberal slogans or ideology of one form or another in a crass attempt to grab power or exploit others. There may be no intention of actually enacting neoliberal policy or striving for neoliberal goals. This issue should be of crucial interest to those who believe (as the author of this article does not) that neoliberalism is systemic in the contemporary world. If neoliberalism is a systemic 'discourse' (as some governmen-tality theorists would have it), then it reproduces itself by producing 'responsibilized' subject/citizens who re-create neoliberal institutions. From this vantage, disingenuous applications of neoliberal discourse would thus work to undermine neoliberal-ism. But if neoliberalism is an 'ideology' that serves merely to mask the true workings of class domination, then disingenuous applications of neoliberal ideas are central to the reproduction of neoliberalism. In such a case, the actual production of autonomous, responsible citizen/subjects would undermine neoliberalism. Few who write as if neoliberalism were systemic in the contemporary world demonstrate awareness of this contradiction.

#### Neolib discourse *creates realities* which re-frame the social violence cited by the Aff. That link turns case … it’s also external offense via neolib’s perpetuation of sexualized, racialized, and socio-economic repression.

Della Faille ’15 Dr. Dimitri DELLA FAILLE (PhD, Sociology) is a professor in International Development and Social Sciences at Université du Québec en Outaouai - “A Sociological Understanding of Neoliberal Discourses of Development” - #E&F - https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02046915/document

This paper will attempt to show that social scientists studying development issues must consider these common ideas with considerable caution. We argue that words are, in fact, actions. And as such, they must be investigated. We contend that an examination of underdevelopment and "developing" societies must go beyond an artificial divide between discourse and action. But also, that it must not limit its definition of discourse to an act of deception. Otherwise, we run the risk of misunderstanding social problems, which is the basis for much social action and collective mobilization in the "developing" world. We will also propose in this paper a number of ways to examine language and discourse that go beyond received ideas. We will attempt to show that they are integral parts of action - whether scholarly, activist, administrative or otherwise - against underdevelopment. In the first place, we will focus most of our explanation on how neoliberal governance and policymaking use language, social representation and discourse to achieve their goals. Using example of neoliberal discourses, we will attempt to show how the main ideologies of the various contemporary development discourses transforms our perception and understanding of development problems. This transformation, we argue, exists both in imposing the use of specific words and in successfully controlling means of communication.

We will begin with a quick presentation of discourse and a definition of neoliberal ideologies. Then, we will demonstrate how discourse analysis could study neoliberal discourses by applying to documents about a natural disaster in the Philippines. After this demonstration, we present other various examples of discourse analysis as it applies to development discourses. Then, we present some of the major approaches and methodologies of discourse analysis. Before concluding, we will present some ethical considerations for the analysis of development discourses.

Words of Caution

A paper about language and discourse would fall short of its goal to draw attention to the use of language if it did not contain at least some form of criticism of usages of the word "development". We argue that calling societies "developing" is actually making a normative statement about the past trajectory, current status and expected future of these societies. Social scientists may contend that political, scientific, ethical or lay statements about development and underdevelopment are in fact "problematizations" of human societies. A problematization is a process by which social relations, practices, rules, institutions, and habits previously established are suddenly viewed as doubtful and problematic (Foucault 2001). The word "development" itself may carry different meanings around the world (Thornton et al. 2012). The understanding and expectations of actions in the name of "development" are conditioned by social representations and interpretations. However, we contend that development discourses are problematizations of the "developing" world because they transform the history of societies of Latin America, Asia, Africa and some parts of Europe into a long story of troubles and failures. They do that in order to justify social transformations and interventions (Escobar 1994). We also contend that they are problematizations because they produce cultural discourses that apply specifically to "developing" countries, and therefore reinforce ideas about the perceived superiority of "developed" countries over the rest of the world (Mohanty 1984).

This paper refuses to hierarchize societies based on perceptions of their economic achievement, their form of political governance or the global recognition of their cultural products. We recognize that discourses about "development" are problematizations, and that perceptions of any social, political or cultural inferiority of these regions, countries or populations must be criticized. We therefore use the term "developing" for some societies, not as a normative statement on regions, countries, and populations viewed as economically, socially, politically or culturally inferior to the "developed world", but rather as an unfortunate shortcut to describe regions and countries in which actors desire to act in the name of "development". There is a wealth of scholarly literature on criticism of the use of the word "development", some of which is evoked further in this paper.

We will give further explanations that might help you better understand why we must be cautious when comparing societies in terms of their perceived "development". Now that we explained why we, in this paper, are cautious of talking about "development" and "underdevelopment", let us very briefly present some aspects of discourse and its analysis.

Understanding discourse and its analysis

If discourse analysis is getting more recognition in development studies, before we further embark in this paper it must be noted that if you chose to study discourse, you might encounter disapproval (Ziai 2015). As we have argued elsewhere, discourse analysis is often viewed with reservations or criticized in the context of the study of "development" and "underdevelopment" (Delia Faille 2011; 2014). But very often, the criticism comes from misunderstanding of what discourse actually is. Discourse analysts face many commonly held ideas, as per the examples we have provided in the introduction of this paper. We believe that the best way for social scientists to justify the analysis of words, language and communication is to approach it with a clear definition of discourse that relates to the study of social relations and also to present convincing analysis. This section attempts to clarify our definition of discourse analysis and the following sections will attempt to illustrate how this analysis relates to the study of social relations and "development".

Social scientists studying discourses are examining the social and institutional constraints of language. At the conceptual level, language can be apprehended either as a social fact determined by material conditions and social domination, or as a field of social activity with specific rules and a social environment where meaning, social relations, and society are produced. Most discourse analysts adopt the latter conception. They attempt to reveal the strategies that aim to convey cultural values and ideologies, whether implicitly or explicitly. They define language as the production of meaning and the results of acts of communication that are conditioned by collective rules and social codes. Through the use of language, social groups and individuals come to build their identity, describe themselves, interact, and share ideas. Language is thus more than the use of specific vocabularies and grammars. It is an organized sequence of social acts that is not limited to speech or utterance. Some analysts study images and material artefacts as sequences of social acts and social strategies to convey ideologies.

In the 1960s French and British philosophers, sociologists and political scientists began to understand the production of language in terms of communication strategies. This new direction was dubbed the "linguistic turn" of humanities and social sciences (Rorty 1967). Based on several decades of debate in literary study, linguistics and anthropology, discourse analysis emerged as a new discipline. It proposed a way to see language as a field of social confrontation and struggles. Discourse is therefore understood as the social usage of language and studied as a social practice and a materialization of social relations. It means that discourse analysts are interested in the social practice of using language to put forward agendas, to express dissent, to defend a position, or to transmit values. They also study acts of silencing and censoring - such as prohibiting other worldviews from circulating and being heard. Therefore, discourse analysts see language as a series of social processes and they acknowledge that language is not limited to otherwise unrelated individual acts.

Discourse analysis could be described as a political understanding of the use of language in the context of unequal access to platforms of decision making, economic resources, and social recognition. As we will attempt to demonstrate throughout this paper, the study of discourse is not limited to looking for hidden agendas, lies or the uttering of meaningless and empty words. Deception is only one of the strategies used to convey worldviews, and it is not necessarily the most effective or even the most interesting for discourse analysts.

Some schools of discourse analysis criticize social reproduction of gender inequality, racism and social class. Critical Discourse Analysis is an example of this field. For this school of thought, discourse analysis is the social study of language, its social constraints and its effects (Fairclough 2001). Through language, social groups come to represent society in a way that perpetuates domination, positive or negative discrimination, and social repression. Critical discourse analysts look at the perpetuation of social conflicts and unequal relations of power. They examine issues related to gender, sexuality, social class, and ethnicity.

While our presentation of neoliberal discourses and its analysis does not fall totally under the umbrella of the school of Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper demonstrates how to analyse discourse in the context of the study of global inequalities, social discrimination and repression. We are critical of the current state of global politics, economy and society as it reproduces and reinforces inequalities. Therefore, the next section presents a critical analysis of neoliberalism understood as an ideology whose aim is to impose its ~~worldviews~~ (perspective) and the interest of the actors it attempts to defend and whose interests this ideology is putting forward in the context of development discourses.